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  ABSTRACT  
 
 
This thesis critically examines the criticism that has been levelled at normative 
multiculturalism and discusses a potential way in which multiculturalism can be 
reconstructed to better address the difficulties of a diverse population.  
Multiculturalism, principally liberal multiculturalism for the purposes of the current 
project, has been the subject of much criticism in recent years. Reconciling a liberal 
position based on the primacy of individual rights, with the protection of and rights of 
marginalised or otherwise vulnerable groups has proven difficult. Two key failings of 
the current liberal approach are identified.  Firstly, there is a tendency to pursue a 
hands-off approach, whereby the state is reluctant to interfere in the affairs of 
minority groups, to the detriment of vulnerable internal minorities.   Secondly the 
preoccupation with respect for difference and a ‘right to culture’ has lead to minority 
cultures being essentialised and concretised in a way that perpetuates existing power 
hierarchies within these groups as well as ignoring natural processes of cultural 
development and adaptation. Jacob Levy’s ‘Multiculturalism of Fear’ is considered.  
By placing the prevention of fear and humiliation above the preservation of the ‘right 
to culture’ Levy is able to circumvent the preoccupation with being seen to interfere 
with cultural practices. There are difficulties with this theory however and these are 
discussed. The thesis concludes by suggesting a way in which the ‘Multiculturalism 
of Fear’ could be used as a starting point for the development of an alternative 
approach to multiculturalism, one that might remove the preoccupation with 
difference and foster positive inter- and intra-cultural understanding. 
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Introduction 
 
Multiculturalism is a fact of modern society. Individuals identify as part of one or 
more of an endless variety of cultural groupings, and this shapes the way that they act 
in society in general. The importance and durability of cultural membership has many 
positive affects – providing communities, values and ways of life - as well as negative 
ones - creating tension between cultures and groups and distorting the way in which 
groups interact with each other and with the state.  
Legally and politically speaking, multiculturalism refers to the way in which these 
different ‘belongings’ are dealt with on an institutional and societal level. The goal of 
most policies of multiculturalism is to foster an environment in which members of 
different cultures are able to retain their own beliefs and values, whilst participating 
as equals in a liberal society.  
 
In recent years there has been somewhat of a ‘backlash’ against typical strains of 
liberal multicultural thought, and this has led to a general distaste with the concept, 
some going so far as to declare that multiculturalism has fallen and is ‘over’. It will be 
argued that this is not the case. There has certainly been a move away from support 
for many multicultural models, and the current approaches leave much to be desired, 
however multiculturalism, if anything, is more important than ever. The global 
political climate in recent years has highlighted the problems of intercultural tension 
and misunderstanding; in the United Kingdom and in many other Western 
democracies there is increased tension between cultural groups, particularly following 
the increased visibility of terrorism, and the ‘influx’ of immigrants from countries 
whose traditional cultures are far removed from those of the local population. Further, 
the economic downturn has created hostility (in some cases open hostility) between 
groups and in many countries there has been a rise in support for nationalist parties 
calling for measures of segregation and decreased sensitivity to cultural difference.1  
 
It is suggested that, in the present context, these circumstances have two important 
consequences: firstly that there has been a decline in popular support for multicultural 
policies, and secondly that this political situation has been mischaracterised as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For a discussion of this phenomenon see Hage, Ghassan. White nation: Fantasies of white supremacy 
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failure of multiculturalism. This thesis discusses the ways in which the theory of 
multiculturalism has struggled; quite apart from the particular political circumstances 
which have led to its unpopularity. Multiculturalism, particularly liberal 
multiculturalism, has faced a number of difficulties since it came to prominence in the 
latter half of the twentieth century. The challenges of reconciling a liberal society, 
based on the primacy of individual rights with the protection of and support of culture 
(inherently a collective enterprise) have been great. From failing to protect vulnerable 
members within vulnerable groups to undermining principles of universalism, there 
have been many criticisms levelled at multicultural theory. This thesis aims to 
critically examine the perceived ‘flaws’ of multiculturalism and to explore how one 
might move beyond these flaws, and construct a multicultural theory better equipped 
to deal with the fact of (descriptively) multicultural societies.  
 
Section A considers the perceived ‘fall’ of liberal multiculturalism. In particular it 
will address the work of Will Kymlicka, Ayelet Shachar and Brian Barry. Liberal 
multiculturalism has been attacked from a number of different positions, and these 
positions are largely divided into internal and external critiques of multiculturalism. 
The internal critiques, most of them feminist critiques, take aim at the way in which 
multiculturalism fails to protect vulnerable members within cultural groups whilst the 
external critiques look at the difficulties in relationships between cultural groups and 
between the state and cultural groups.  
 
In essence, the internal critiques argue that vulnerable members within cultural groups 
can suffer when policies are put in place that result in the perpetuation of inequalities 
in that group. The fear of being seen to interfere with the practices of a cultural group 
means that the state, under liberal multicultural models, often puts vulnerable group 
members at risk by tacitly approving practices that may be harmful to them. The 
liberal focus on the rights of the individual, and in particular on the concept of the 
‘right to culture’ make it difficult to interfere. Patriarchal structures and 
discriminatory rules are able to persist, effectively protected by the state, under the 
rubric of the respect for culture. The use of ‘cultural defences’ in criminal cases is 
used as an illustration of the potential dangers of this tendency. Whereas some 
suggest that the existence of the ‘right to exit’ a cultural community provides 
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sufficient safeguard to protect these vulnerable members, it is argued that this is not 
the case. 
With regard to the external critiques, it is believed that legislating to protect cultural 
practices and policies such as creating separate religious schooling in order to ensure 
legal equality between groups can in fact do more harm than good. The enshrining of 
a cultural practice in law prevents the natural process of cultural adaptation and 
development, and further increases the differentiation between cultural groups. By 
emphasising difference in this way some approaches to multiculturalism can increase 
the risk of self-segregation and ghettoization, as well as perpetuating stereotypes and 
reducing positive cross-cultural interaction.  
 
As well as examining the critiques, this thesis aims to discuss the response to these 
critiques and to evaluate their effectiveness. Following this analysis it is argued that 
there are two main challenges facing multicultural theory, and in particular liberal 
multiculturalism; namely that they tend to adopt a hands-off approach to cultural 
practices, in a way which fails to protect vulnerable internal groups, and that they tend 
towards the concretisation of cultures, stunting natural development and reducing the 
possibility for inter-cultural dialogue and adaptation.  
 
Section B considers a possible alternative structure of multiculturalism, as suggested 
by Jacob Levy in his influential ‘The Multiculturalism of Fear’. Based on a concept of 
negative consequentialism, the Multiculturalism of Fear argues that the elimination of 
fear, rather than the promotion of liberal rights, should take priority in a multicultural 
society. As opposed to more popular liberal forms of multiculturalism, which struggle 
with the structural difficulties posed by accommodating group membership and group 
rights within a society based on individual rights, Levy views these ‘rights’ as 
secondary to the prevention of fear, cruelty and humiliation. Rather than focusing on 
an idea of the ‘good life’, the Multiculturalism of Fear is based on the avoidance of 
the ‘summum malum’, or universally recognisable ‘bad’. In addition to articulating 
this new priority model, Levy attempts to address the way in which the application of 
multicultural models should be approached. It is suggested that there needs to be 
greater recognition of both the durability and flexibility of culture: neither natural 
processes of cultural development nor the importance of culture to the individual 
should be underestimated. Levy advocates a ‘long-line’ approach to the treatment of 
	   4	  
cultural practices, arguing that a gradual process is the most effective way of altering 
behaviours that are based in deeply held cultural beliefs.  
 
 
Although Levy’s ‘Multiculturalism of Fear’ has great potential to construct a theory 
of multiculturalism better suited to reality than that of the more traditional liberal 
thinkers, it does not quite execute that aim. Due to a combination of factors, Levy 
confines himself to extreme examples and seems to struggle with some of the same 
difficulties as the liberal multiculturalists. Drawing on the lessons learned from both 
the criticism of current multicultural models and from Levy’s work the final part of 
this thesis addresses the possibility of developing the thesis of the Multiculturalism of 
Fear. Firstly it will be argued that there should be a move away from the articulation 
of multiculturalism in terms of ‘minority’ and ‘majority’, as the terms create 
unnecessary differentiation and help to perpetuate ideas of minorities as ‘other’, 
whilst discouraging any introspection on the part of the ‘majority’. The use of a 
‘reasonable man’ test would remove some of the difficulty created by the perception 
that the ‘minority’ is judged by ‘majority’ norms. Secondly it will be considered that a 
negative theory has greater potential than a ‘positive’ one to effectively address the 
difficulties faced by virtue of being in a diverse society. If a concept of the summum 
malum is combined with a negative presumption that a cultural practice is ‘guilty until 
proven innocent’ of creating fear then vulnerable members of cultural groups will be 
better protected from the perpetuation of in-group inequalities.   
 
 
Whilst the criticism of multiculturalism has been wide-ranging and persistent, this 
thesis aims to demonstrate that all is not lost. There are significant difficulties to 
overcome, however multiculturalism can and should be reconstructed to deal with the 
realities of contemporary diverse societies.  
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A: THE RISE AND ‘FALL’ OF MULTICULTURALISM 
 
 
The development of contemporary multiculturalism 
 
 
The origins of multicultural theory 
 
Before embarking on an examination of the ‘fall’ of multiculturalism and the 
possibility of its redemption, it is necessary to consider some of the background and 
terminology of the multicultural discourse. Multiculturalism has come to encompass a 
huge body of political, social and legal thought.  
In order to be properly understood, a distinction must be made between (at the very 
least) the normative usage of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘multicultural’, and the 
descriptive usage of the same. In a descriptive sense, multicultural denotes simply the 
presence of more than one culture in a particular space, state or society. British 
society is multicultural because of the fact that its inhabitants belong to a huge variety 
of cultures and cultural backgrounds. In this way, most European countries have been 
multicultural for hundreds if not thousands of years.  
 
Herder and Montesquieu, among others, recognised the importance of culture and 
cultural difference long before there was a normative conception of multiculturalism.2 
Whilst their conceptions of diversity and the importance of culture vary both from 
each other and from current ideas, each demonstrates an understanding that an 
individual’s culture is intrinsically important to them, and affects the way that they 
view and engage with the world. Descriptive multiculturalism was as much a fact for 
them as it is now.   
 
In its normative meaning however, multiculturalism is a far younger idea, one closely 
associated with the politics of difference and the politics of recognition. There is some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For a discussion and comparison of Herder and Montesquieu’s contributions to cultural pluralism see 
Bikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: cultural diversity and political theory, (MacMillan Press, 
2000) chapter 2 
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debate as to the exact origin of the contemporary, normative notion of 
multiculturalism. The initial use of the word ‘multiculturalism’ in political discourse 
is often associated with the changes in immigration policies in Australia and Canada 
in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. Previously Australia had operated a ‘whites-only’ 
immigration policy; however the relaxation of such rules resulted in a large influx of 
Asian immigrants, many of whom desired to maintain significant elements of their 
cultural heritage.3  
Similarly Canada faced difficult decisions about its cultural make up and heritage, 
given tensions between its French- and English-speaking populations. This resulted in 
the creation of a ‘Royal Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism’, which in 
turn led to a commitment to wider cultural pluralism becoming official policy. 4 
An alternative view (although it is perhaps reconcilable with the above) is that 
‘multiculturalism’ developed in response to the advent of the international human 
rights movement and the emphasis of ideals of equality and shared humanity, in spite 
of cultural (or any other) differences.  
Kymlicka argues that ‘support for multiculturalism rests on the assumption that there 
is a shared commitment to human rights across ethnic and religious lines. If states 
perceive certain groups as unable or unwilling to respect human-rights norms, they 
are unlikely to accord them multicultural rights or resources.’5 Therefore, from this 
perspective, it follows that prior to the idea of universal human rights coming to 
prominence, there was not, nor could there have been, a concept of normative 
multiculturalism.  
Whilst the idea of liberal rights was hardly new, the claim of their universality only 
began to gain international traction and credibility following the Second World War. 
Previous ideas of inherent ethnic or racial superiority or inferiority were inextricably 
associated with Nazism and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights marked 
an attempt to move away from that legacy. Ali Rattansi emphasises the significance 
of this move:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Lopez, Mark. The origins of multiculturalism in Australian politics, 1945-1975. Melbourne 
University Publishing, 2000.	  
4 Ali Rattansi, Multiculturalism: A very short introduction,  (OUP 2011) p8 
5 Will Kymlicka, Multiculturalism: Success, Failure and the Future, 2012 Migration Policy Institute p2 
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‘The real novelty of this principle of human equality should be recognised. In 
1919 when Japan had tried to introduce a clause regarding human equality into 
the covenant of the League of Nations, this had been immediately rejected by 
the Western nations. This is not surprising. The Europeans, after all, were 
involved in defending empires in large parts of Asia and Africa based quite 
explicitly on racial principles which deemed whites superior to other races.’6  
 
New ideas of equality and increased immigration to Europe from former colonies 
made cultural difference more prominent than it had been previously. Further, from 
the mid twentieth century there was a reassertion of feelings of nationalism, 
particularly on the part of sub-state national groups.7 As in Canada, this led to calls 
for greater recognition and even independence for such minorities. These factors 
combined almost to force states to respond to questions of cultural diversity, thus 
creating the need for a normative multiculturalism.  
Will Kymlicka identifies these factors as being three particular waves of political 
movement initiated by the assertion of universal equality ‘to contest the lingering 
presence or enduring effects of older hierarchies’: 
 
‘1) the struggle for decolonisation, concentrated in the period 1948-65; 
2) the struggle against racial segregation and discrimination, initiated and 
exemplified by the African-American civil-rights movement from 1955-1965; 
and 
3) the struggle for multiculturalism and minority rights, which emerged in the 
late 1960s.’8 
 
 
Whether it was the catalyst or not, the human rights revolution served a dual purpose 
in the development of normative multiculturalism, being both a means of arguing for 
equality, and also a way of mediating and evaluating cultural claims:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Rattansi, Multiculturalism: A very short introduction, p14 7	  c Catt, Helen, and Michael Murphy. Sub-state nationalism: a comparative analysis of institutional 
design. Routledge, 2002.	  
8 Kymlicka, Multiculturalism: Success, failure and the future, p4 
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‘Insofar as historically excluded or stigmatized groups struggle against earlier 
hierarchies in the name of equality, they too have to renounce their own 
traditions of exclusion oppression in the treatment of, say, women, gays, 
people of mixed race, religious dissenters, and so on.’ 9 
 
In the event, the precise circumstances that led to the development of multicultural 
theory in its current incarnation are likely to remain disputed, and are not the focus of 
the present discussion. It is likely that a combination or combinations of the above 
factors resulted in the need for a body of theory10 which could attempt to deal with the 
questions raised, that the precise circumstances varied from place to place and that, 
given the diverse set of questions that multiculturalism aims to answer, each initial 
theory was designed to fit the circumstances in which it was needed, rather than an 
attempt (until slightly later) to create a coherent body of thought. 
 
What is important to consider, however, is that normative multiculturalism and the 
circumstances that lead to its development only came into being relatively recently, 
compared to the fact of multicultural societies. In many ways normative 
multiculturalism is a new attempt to answer an old question – how best to 
accommodate peoples of diverse cultural backgrounds within the same society? This 
question is now discussed from both a political theory and a social science 
perspective; considering on the one hand how an emphasis on group identity can be 
reconciled with a parallel focus on liberal rights11 and on the other how different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Kymlicka, Multiculturalism: Success, failure and future, p4 10	  The body of theory encompasses questions of citizenship (Kymlicka, Will. Politics in the 
vernacular: Nationalism, multiculturalism, and citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
education (Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan. "Beyond the melting pot: The Negroes, Puerto 
Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City." (1963).; Glazer, Nathan. We are all 
multiculturalists now. Harvard University Press, 1998.), recognition (c Young, Iris Marion. Justice and 
the Politics of Difference. Princeton University Press, 2011., Taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton University Press, 41 William St., Princeton, NJ 
08540., 1994.), immigration (Modood, Tariq, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 
eds.Multiculturalism, Muslims and citizenship: A European approach. Routledge, 2012. 
, Joppke, Christian. "Multiculturalism and immigration: A comparison of the United States, Germany, 
and Great Britain." Theory and society 25.4 (1996): 449-500.), and identity (Phinney, Jean S., et al. 
"Ethnic identity, immigration, and well-being: An interactional perspective." Journal of social 
issues 57.3 (2001): 493-510.) 	  11	  See Brian Barry’s Culture and Equality, which will be discussed in more detail below	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groups can relate to each other on an intercultural level.12 The strength of the claim 
for accommodation of difference has increased over the past decades and now 
minority groups’ ‘demand for recognition goes far beyond the familiar plea for 
toleration, for the latter implies conceding the validity of society’s disapproval and 
relying on its self-restraint. Rather they ask for the acceptance, respect and even 
public affirmation of their differences.’13 
 
Approaches to multiculturalism 
 
Over the past decades multicultural theory has been approached and justified from a 
number of different angles. One of the key justifications comes from the 
communitarian school of thought, and argues that the traditional conception of 
liberalism, with its inherent focus on the primacy of the individual, fails to account for 
the key role that social and cultural groupings play in modern society. Michael 
Walzer articulates this idea: 
 
‘How can any group of people be strangers to one another when each member 
of the group is born with parents, and when these parents have friends, 
relatives, neighbours, comrades at work, coreligionists, and fellow citizens - 
connections, in fact, which are not so much chosen as passed on and 
inherited?’14 
 
Whilst Walzer is himself sceptical about the limitations of the communitarian 
critique, believing it to be ‘doomed…to eternal recurrence’, he suggests that it sheds 
some light on the balance that must be struck between the interests of the individual 
and the interests of the group.  Approached from this angle, multiculturalism aims to 
reassert some of the primacy of the group in society. Languages and cultures are 
viewed as social goods, which are intrinsically of equal worth. The ideas of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See for example AlSayyad and Castells (eds) Muslim Europe of Euro-Islam: politics, culture, and 
citizenship in the age of globalization (Lexington Books, 2002), as well Berry, John W. "Immigration, 
acculturation, and adaptation." Applied psychology 46.1 (1997): 5-34. 	  
13 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism p1 
14 Michael Walzer, ‘The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism’, 1990 Political Theory, Vol. 18 1 p10 
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‘recognition’, as put forward by Charles Taylor,15 aim to ensure the effective equality 
of social goods through the provision of minority rights designed to protect, preserve 
and enhance the group identity. 
 
A second justification for the adoption of multicultural policies is framed in terms of 
post-colonialism.16 This approach focuses less on the value of cultures and of group 
affiliation, and more on a consideration of the ‘debt’ owed to national and indigenous 
minorities. Through questioning the ultimate validity and legitimacy of the majority 
government over the national or indigenous minority this theory advocates the 
adoption of self-government measures and differentiated rights based on group 
membership.   
 
Currently the main approach to the justification of multicultural policies comes from 
liberalism itself (as opposed to the communitarian approach which opposes the liberal 
focus on individualism, and the postcolonial approach which does not particularly 
concern itself with liberalism). Drawing both on principles of autonomy and of 
equality, Kymlicka constructs his theory of liberal multiculturalism and differentiated 
citizenship. Whilst the emphasis remains on the individual, it is argued that the true 
liberation of the individual can only be achieved by autonomy, and that preserving the 
cultural framework allows that individual the autonomy to pursue and adhere to a 
culture of their choosing. Others have been sceptical about the possibility of 
combining this individual emphasis with the discussion of groups: ‘can a theory of 
rights that is so individualistically constructed deal adequately with struggles for 
recognition in which it is the articulation and assertion of collective identities which 
seems to be at stake?’17 In terms of equality, Kymlicka believes that members of 
minority cultures are automatically at a disadvantage compared to their counterparts 
in the majority culture, and that extra safeguards for the integrity of that minority 
culture are needed.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  c Taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1994.	  16	  c Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p116 on the role of history in determining the strength of a 
cultural claim.	  
17 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Struggles for recognition in the democratic constitutional state’, (1993) European 
Journal of Philosophy, 1.2 p128. Habermas himself is ultimately of the opinion that liberalism can in 
fact deal adequately with this challenge.  
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This form of ‘liberal’ multiculturalism (which by and large is the focus of this 
section) divides those belonging to minorities into three groupings: national 
minorities, indigenous peoples, and immigrant populations. Indigenous populations, 
such as the Maori in New Zealand or the Inuit in Canada, are viewed as having a 
particularly strong claim to accommodation.18 National minorities are categorised as 
those that have a long history in the country, may speak a different language to the 
majority, and usually have a ‘homeland’ within the state, such as Quebecois in 
Canada, or the Welsh in the UK.  These minorities often have the greatest claim to 
self-government rights. The most contentious groups for the purposes of claims to 
multicultural accommodation are those of relatively recent immigrant origin. In 
general the first two groups are seen as having the stronger claim to ‘group rights’ 
whilst immigrant populations are seen to have a limited claim to what Kymlicka terms 
polyethnic rights: 
 
‘It is important to distinguish this sort or cultural diversity from that of 
national minorities. Immigrant groups are not ‘nations’ and do not occupy 
homelands. Their distinctiveness is manifested primarily in their family lives 
and in voluntary associations, and is not inconsistent with their institutional 
integration.’19 
 
The ‘polyethnic’ rights given to immigrant populations tend to include both 
extensions to existing legislation, such as the provision of resources for Islamic faith 
schools in the UK, in addition to more established majority religions, and exemptions 
from otherwise universally applicable legislation. Examples of this would include 
exempting Sikh men from the requirement to wear a helmet on a motorbike or on 
construction sites.20 Liberal multiculturalism for Kymlicka is ‘based upon the idea 
that justice between groups requires that the members of different groups be accorded 
different rights’.21,22 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  See discussion in Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys; for criticism of this position see  Parekh, 
Rethinking Multiculturalism, p102	  
19 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p14 20	  Ibid.	  p31	  
21 That justice between individuals requires justice between groups is implicitly stated. 
	   12	  
 
During the first wave of multicultural thought, there was much reflection on the 
possibilities and benefits of a system of differentiated citizenship.23 Whilst equality in 
terms of human rights and anti-discrimination legislation allowed minorities to be 
equal on paper, it was suggested that additional rights were needed in order for 
minorities to achieve effective equality. Kymlicka is a strong supporter of this kind of 
concession: 
 
‘…it is increasingly accepted in many countries that some forms of cultural 
difference can only be accommodated through special legal or constitutional 
measures, above and beyond the common rights of citizenship.’24 
 
‘These group-specific measures… are intended to help ethnic groups and 
religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it 
hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the 
dominant society.’ 25 
 
The recognition debate also helped to shape the multicultural discourse, by 
emphasising the importance of cultural affirmation to the identity and development of 
the individual. Whilst the debate itself will not be discussed in detail, there are certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Whilst Kymlicka does make a concerted effort to differentiate between different types of minority 
claims, the same cannot be said for much of the literature on multiculturalism. Whilst the focus of 
much of the debate, and indeed of the present argument, is on immigrant populations there is a 
tendency to approach ‘minority’ as synonymous with ‘immigrant’, and therefore many of the 
arguments against normative multiculturalism are not, in fact, critiques (at least effective ones) of it as 
a whole, rather critiques of its use to accommodate immigrant populations. Similarly most media 
references to normative multiculturalism tend to only concern multiculturalism as it applies to 
immigrant populations.  
 23	  See for example Iris Young, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal 
Citizenship”, Ethics 1989 99: 250–274; MS Williams, Voice, Trust, and Memory. Marginalized 
Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation, 1998, Princeton, Princeton University Press and 
Kymlicka and Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship 
Theory”, 1994 Ethics, 104 (2): 352–381 	  
24 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p26 
25 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship p30 
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elements that aid the understanding of the importance of culture to the individual and 
group. In particular the nomos became an important concept for multicultural theory, 
principally in the development of liberal multiculturalism, and its emphasis on the 
‘right to culture’. Robert Cover coined the term nomos in the early 1980’s to denote 
the normative universe within which individuals are able to operate, one in which 
‘law and cultural narrative are inseparably related.’26 The idea of the nomos suggests 
that law cannot be considered separately from individuals and their beliefs: 
 
 
‘The student of law may come to identify the normative world with the 
professional paraphernalia of social control. The rules and principles of 
justice, the formal institutions of the law, and the conventions of a social order 
are, indeed, important to that world; they are, however, but a small part of the 
normative universe that ought to claim our attention. No set of legal 
institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and 
give it meaning.’27 
 
Therefore, with a new awareness of the cultural differences between minorities within 
the population, theorists came to consider the diverse nomoi that existed within any 
given state, and the way in which multiculturalism might help to preserve these 
nomoi. Not only was the nomos vital to the individual’s interpretation of the law, it 
was a crucial part of their identity, and as such was important to protect. As the make-
up of the state changed, whether from the influx of immigrants, or the re-assertion of 
national identity and the claims of indigenous peoples, the narratives present in a 
(descriptively) multicultural society were no longer ones that could be ignored in the 
construction of legal norms.  
 
Multicultural theory came to incorporate a huge body of political and social thought 
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. However since the early 1990’s it 
has fallen from grace in many circles. In what has sometimes been characterised as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural jurisdictions: Cultural differences and women’s rights, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) p2 
27 Robert Cover, ‘Foreword: nomos and narrative’, (1983) Harvard Law Review, 97, p4 
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the ‘retreat’ from multiculturalism or the ‘multicultural backlash’28 the desirability, in 
both theory and practice, of a commitment to ideas of differentiated citizenship and 
entrenched diversity began to be called into question. It is with these critiques that the 
rest of this first section is concerned.  
 
 
The multicultural ‘backlash’ 
 
The criticism of multiculturalism has been widespread. Shachar divides the ‘second 
wave’ of multicultural theory (or the ‘backlash’ arguments against multiculturalism) 
into two categories, internal – concerning the potentially negative effects that 
multiculturalism might have on community members - and external – regarding the 
relationships between cultures and between cultures and the state. 29 
 
 
Internal critiques of multiculturalism 
 
Shachar explains that the internal critiques often focus on the position of vulnerable 
individuals within accommodated groups, and the fears that respect for group 
difference can lead to in-group subordination. Of those who raise concerns of this 
‘internal’ kind, the vast majority still accept ‘the basic thrust of the justice claims 
raised by minority groups’. In this way it can be seen as a critique of the application 
of multiculturalism, rather than of the body of theory itself. The focus tends to be on 
the practical impact that specific policies and forms of accommodation can have on 
group members, and the way in which costs and benefits are distributed within a 
community.30  
In what Shachar calls the ‘paradox of multicultural vulnerability’,31 individuals inside 
the group can be injured by the very reforms that are designed to improve their status 
as a member of a minority group within the multicultural state.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  see for example Kymlicka, ‘Multicultrualism; success, failure and future’, p3	  
29 Shachar, ‘Two Critiques of Multiculturalism’, (2001) Cardozo Law Review, 23 253 
30 c Kymlicka, ‘The new debate on minority rights’, in Laden and Owen (eds), Multiculturalism and 
Political Theory, (Cambridge University Press, 2007) p44  31	  Shachar,	  Multicultural	  Jurisdictions,	  p5	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Fears have been voiced that liberal theories of multicultural accommodation, such as 
those presented and defended by Kymlicka, in fact pose a threat to the core values of 
liberalism.32 The idea of the centrality of individual rights comes into question when 
groups are granted powers to organise their internal affairs. In the development of 
group rights for any minority community, it is generally the community leaders who 
negotiate and campaign for these rights. In this situation ‘power would in effect be 
vested in the most powerful elites within these groups, to lord it over their members 
without the kinds of constitutional constraints and dispersals of power that are part 
and parcel of the organisation of liberal states’.33 These same leaders have an interest 
in maintaining their power within the community, and so will most likely argue for 
rights and policies that play to their personal interests. In this way, many policies of 
multicultural accommodation serve to perpetuate existing power hierarchies within 
minority groups and deprive subordinate group members of the voice they are 
supposedly guaranteed by a liberal state. 
In a culture where, for example, women are often seen as playing a secondary role, or 
as being subordinate to men, this can be damaging. By ceding control over certain 
areas of family law or of education policy, the state gives more power to those who 
wish to perpetuate inequality. On this point Susan Moller Okin argues that until 
suppressed groups are granted full access to and participation in negotiations for 
group rights, their interests may in fact be harmed rather than promoted by the 
granting of such rights.34 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  c discussion in Habermas, Struggles for Recognition, also AS Roald, ‘Multiculturalism and 
Pluralism in Secular Society; individual or collective rights?’, Ars Disputandi : The Online Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion vol. 5 p147 and Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights. by Will Kymlicka Review by: Brian Barry Ethics, Vol. 107, No. 1 (Oct., 1996), pp. 153-155 	  
33 DM Weinstock, ‘Liberalism, multiculturalism and internal minorities’, in AS Laden and D Owen 
(eds), Multiculturalism and Political Theory, p246 
34 Susan Okin, Is Multiculturalism bad for women (with respondents), (Princeton University Press, 
1999) p24 
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Feminist critiques 
 
The internal critiques of multiculturalism are most often feminist critiques, focusing 
on the role of gender within minority groups and the perpetuation of patriarchal 
structures. It is noted, however, that these arguments apply equally to any 
subordinated group, particularly children35 and homosexuals. 
Okin is one of the strongest proponents of this internal critique. She focuses on the 
oppression of women and girls, although she has acknowledged that the arguments 
can and should be extended to all subordinated groups within minorities.36  
 
The feminist critique of multiculturalism generally has two levels. The first 
scrutinises the assumption that policies which aim to respect difference are beneficial 
for all group members, and the second aims to highlight the way in which in-group 
power relations and debates over ‘authentic’ and ‘correct’ interpretations of tradition 
and culture can put women at risk ‘when captured by more conservative or 
fundamental elements’.37 
 
During its formative stages, Shachar asserts that this critique ‘highlighted the 
blindness of first-wave multiculturalism to a number of significant factors: intra-
group rights violations, gendered power relations and the central role that women play 
in many minority communities given their heightened gender responsibilities as 
‘cultural’ conduits of the group’s distinct narrative of the world, that is, its nomos’.38 
 
The internal feminist critique was largely successful in this initial aim, raising 
awareness and provoking debate on the potential tensions arising between cultural 
protection and women’s rights.39 In its more recent incarnations, the critique has 
begun to address more complex issues such as the public policy implications of these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 c R Reich, ‘minors in minorities’, in Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev (eds) Minorities within 
Minorities: equality, rights and diversity, (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
36 Okin, Is Multiculturalism bad for women?, p117 
37 Shachar, Feminism and multiculturalism: mapping the terrain, in Laden and Owen (eds), 
Multiculturalism and Political Theory, p115  
38 ibid p116 39	  see AS Roald ‘Multiculturalism and Pluralism in Secular Society; individual or collective rights?’, 
Ars Disputandi : The Online Journal for Philosophy of Religion vol. 5 p149	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tensions, and the way in which they might be remedied. Shachar divides those 
developing these debates into three categories: liberal feminists, post-colonial 
feminists and multicultural feminists.  
 
i) Liberal Feminism 
 
Liberal feminism asserts that liberal values should be distributed equally between 
genders. Okin is one of the main proponents of this viewpoint. The position ‘suggests 
a strong presumption in favour of depoliticising group-based identities, a process that 
has been associated with the strict separation of law from religion’.40 Okin has 
attracted criticism for what is perceived to be her overly simplistic view of minority 
cultures, which, whilst purporting to be feminist, is at times bordering on 
xenophobic.41 She portrays minority cultures as being consistently sexist and illiberal, 
to the point that she suggests many women would be in a better position if their 
culture were ‘to become extinct (so that its members would become integrated into 
the less sexist surrounding culture)…’42 This, accompanied by statements such as 
‘much of most cultures is about controlling women’ has made Okin somewhat of a 
punching bag for liberal multiculturalists. Bikhu Parekh illustrates this view: 
 
If some (women) do not share the feminist view, it would be wrong to say that 
they are victims of a culturally generated false consciousness and in need of 
liberation by well-meaning outsiders. That is patronising, even impertinent, 
and denies them the very equality we wish to extend to them. This is not to say 
that they might not be brainwashed, for sometimes they are, but rather that we 
should avoid the mistaken conclusion that those who do not share our beliefs 
about their wellbeing are all misguided victims of indoctrination. 43 
 
This is not to suggest that there is no substance in Okin’s arguments, merely that they 
fail to take into account the realities of individuals’ multiple affiliations and the 
diversity of minority cultures and experiences. Further Shachar observes that ‘Okin 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Shachar, Feminism and Multiculturalism, p118 41	  c Parekh’s response to Okin – ‘A varied moral world’ in Is multiculturalism bad for women?, p73	  
42 Okin, Is multiculturalism bad for women?, p22 
43 Parekh, ‘A varied moral world’, in Okin, Is multiculturalism bad for women?, p73 
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apparently believes that while significant changes in the gender norms of the majority 
culture in Western societies have occurred as a result of human agency and resistance, 
no comparable potential for substantive egalitarian reform exists for the minority 
culture’.44 Although the way in which Okin’s arguments have been put forward and 
articulated is inflammatory (and possibly deliberately so), they have been helpful in 
paving the way for a more nuanced feminist critique of multiculturalism.  
 
Okin views feminist issues as inherent to the idea of minority rights, and as such has 
been suggested to be one of the few proponents of the critique who view it as a 
blanket objection to the idea of minority rights.45 However this is not strictly true as 
she states that ultimately, ‘the compatibility of group autonomy with the liberal 
commitment to individual rights thus comes crucially to depend upon the degree to 
which individual members actually consent to the strictures that are visited upon them 
as group members’,46 suggesting that she is of the opinion that minority rights can 
work, as long as these issues are taken into account.  
 
ii) Post-colonial feminism and cultural defences  
 
The second group that Shachar identifies, that of post-colonial feminism, focuses on 
some of the issues raised in the criticism of Okin’s position.  In particular the critique 
questions simplistic understanding of culture and focuses on the idea mentioned 
above, that group leaders argue for a bastardised version of their ‘culture’ which 
serves their interests, and can actively exclude the voices and concerns of other group 
members.47 Further, this second group criticises the assumption of superiority of the 
majority culture that they deem to be evident in the way that accommodation is 
approached. Minority groups are accommodated to varying degrees, dependent on the 
way in which their cultural practices are perceived as being acceptable to or 
recognisable in the majority culture. This is often illustrated by the discussion of 
successful ‘cultural defences’ in the criminal law context.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Shachar, Feminism and Multiculturalism, p121 
45 Kymlicka, The new debate on minority rights, p45 
46 ibid p256 
47 Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism, (Routledge, 
1997) p10 
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The use of cultural defences has been the subject of debate for a long time – well 
before it was incorporated into the feminist wave of multicultural critiques.48 These 
defences tend to apply in much the same way that mental illness or provocation do, in 
that they are used to indicate that the accused did not have the necessary mens rea to 
be considered guilty of the crime. The most frequently discussed examples49 raise 
questions for sexual equality: 
‘… types of cases in which cultural defences have been used most 
successfully are: 1) kidnap and rape by Hmong men who claim that their 
actions are part of their cultural practice of zij poj niam, or ‘marriage by 
capture’; 2) wife-murder by immigrants from Asian and Middle Eastern 
countries whose wives have either committed adultery or treated their 
husbands in a servile way; 3) murder of children by Japanese or Chinese 
mothers who have also tried but failed to kill themselves, and who claim that 
because of their cultural backgrounds the shame of their husbands’ infidelity 
drove them to the culturally condoned practice of mother-child suicide…’50 
Considering the nature of these crimes it is perhaps surprising that the cultural 
defence discussion has not always been centred on gender.  
 
The feminist criticism of cultural defences centres on the idea that they can seem to 
mitigate crimes against women, and to misrepresent women as less autonomous 
beings.51 The received conception of ‘culture’ in the courtroom is that which has been 
conveyed by deemed authority figures within that culture, most of who are typically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  See for example Julia P Sams ‘The Availability of the “Cultural Defense” as an Excuse for Criminal 
Behavior’ (1986) Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 16, 335-354; Doriane 
Lambelet Coleman ‘Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: the Liberal’s Dilemma’(1996) 
Columbia Law Review 95, 1093-1166; Nancy S Kim ‘The Cultural Defence and the Problems of 
Cultural Preemption: A Framework for Analysis’(1997) New Mexico Law Review, 27, 101-139	  
49 The arguably unfortunate tendency of multicultural theorists to base discussions on anecdotal rather 
than statistical examples will be discussed below. The most frequently discussed examples of cultural 
defences come largely from the United States, where a number of academics and activists have been 
vocal in their opposition to the concept.  
50 Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, p18 
51 Anne Phillips, ‘When Culture Means Gender: Issues of Cultural Defense in the English Courts’ 
(2003) Modern Law Review 66/4 510 
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male.52 Further, the use of cultural defences to explain crimes against women who are 
said to have had an affair, and thereby destroyed the honour of their husband, lends 
itself to the assumption that women in minority cultures are typically or should be 
subordinate and subservient in a way not recognised in the dominant culture.  
 
Whilst these observations do raise interesting questions about the way in which the 
acceptance of cultural defences can facilitate the subordination and oppression of 
women, it is suggested that there is not enough evidence to come to the conclusion of 
the post-colonial feminists, who argue that this is reflective of the claim that ‘the 
courts are willing to recognise ‘cultural’ factors for minority defendants only when 
they resonate with mainstream gendered norms’.53  
Rather, it might be that the important conclusion to be drawn is one regarding the way 
in which the legal system can be manipulated in the name of multiculturalism.54  
Phillips is concerned about the use of exemptions in the legal system as it calls in to 
question the principles of legal universalism, and asks whether it is ‘appropriate to 
single out cultural membership as entitling people to differential treatment under the 
law, or does this veer too far in the direction of different laws for different 
communities?’55 The difficulty is not, she argues, that ‘it allows individual 
circumstances to be taken into account in sentencing (of itself, this is hardly 
contentious), but because, in its larger application, it threatens to elevate cultural 
membership above other considerations.’ Further, Phillips recognises that this could 
lead to a situation where largely assimilated individuals ‘rediscover’ their cultural 
affiliation as it becomes useful to them. This use – or abuse - of culture will be 
discussed further subsequently.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Volpp, ‘(Mis)Identifying Culture : Asian women and the cultural defence’ (1994) Harv. Women’s 
LJ 57, p77	  
53 As articulated, but not argued, by Shachar, Feminism and Multiculturalism, p125 For a more detailed 
exposition of this theory, see Daina C Chiu, ‘The Cultural Defense: beyond exclusion, assimilation and 
guilty liberalism’, (1994) California Law Review 82/4 1053 
54 This strand is taken up by Brian Barry in his influential ‘Culture and Equality: an egalitarian 
critique of multiculturalism’ (Polity Press, 2001) in which he criticises the adoption of any public 
policy that considers cultural difference as a factor, and might therefore (intentionally or by 
manipulation) lead to exemptions for otherwise universal laws. This text is discussed in more depth 
below. 
55 Phillips, ‘When Culture Means Gender’, p513 
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In general, the post-colonial feminist approach to the critique of multiculturalism 
comes to a similar conclusion to that of the liberal feminist approach; namely that 
there is very little that can be said in favour of granting minority rights. This would 
seem to be a natural conclusion given the severity of the problems that this body of 
work highlights, however it might be suggested that the focus is too narrow to come 
to such a decision. This approach concentrates on the impact of multiculturalism or of 
culture-sensitive approaches in the context of criminal law, particularly crimes of 
sexual violence, abuse and killings. As such, the conclusions that are drawn do not 
necessarily apply to the broader (and more generally relevant) questions of cultural 
accommodation within education and family law.  
 
iii) Multicultural feminism 
 
The final category of the feminist critiques is the most recent development. Partly in 
response to the negative view of multiculturalism taken by the other two groups, 
multicultural feminism, rather than a critique, is a qualified defence of 
multiculturalism; arguing for a more political understanding of culture. This 
understanding should be one that recognises the utility of culture in the formation of 
the individual, and acknowledges the right and ability of individuals, and particularly 
of women, to determine the importance of their own culture.  The multicultural 
feminists therefore advocate a shift away from the focus on the merits of culture and 
towards a more critical look at the implementation of ideas of multiculturalism at a 
political and juridical level. By moving the feminist focus from simply a discussion of 
the subordination of women within minority cultures to a more general critique of the 
way in which the ‘legal and sociological hardening of borders of inclusion/exclusion 
between minorities and majorities may expose women to risk’,56 the multicultural 
feminist approach goes some way to bridging the theoretical gap between the internal 
critiques and the external critiques. It is noted however, that the distinction between 
internal and external critiques, whilst helpful, is less clear-cut than presented by 
Shachar. This suggestion will be developed more fully below.   
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The ‘Exit option’ 
 
In response to many of the internal, and particularly the feminist, critiques of 
multiculturalism, it has been suggested that the dangers of oppression or 
subordination of group members are best combated by ensuring the right of the group 
member to exit that group.  
 
Chandran Kukathas is a strong supporter of the right to exit, which he defines as an 
‘unalienable right to leave – to renounce membership of – the community’.57 In 
general if an individual is oppressed or subordinated within their cultural or religious 
group, they have the option to exit that group, and to disassociate themselves, thereby 
ending their own suffering. Kukathas supports this exit argument for three reasons.  
 
Firstly his approach to multiculturalism is strongly non-interventionist, which he 
believes to be based on individual rights. The exit thesis supports the idea that 
individuals within minority groups maintain their individual citizenship rights. As 
with all personal associations, an individual’s cultural group should be of no 
consequence to the state. Rather than requiring the state to interfere on an individual’s 
behalf, and therefore be seen to make a judgement about the value or content of a 
culture, Kukathas believes that the responsibility is with the autonomous individual, 
who can make the choice to leave.  
 
Secondly he suggests that the right of exit mitigates in-group oppression or injustice, 
because any acceptance of this is implicitly consensual where there exists another 
option. Closely connected to concept of cultural relativism, there is a suggestion that 
those from outside the culture should not and cannot evaluate the oppressiveness of a 
minority culture.58 Once again from a liberal perspective, Kukathas argues that 
individual’s ‘wish to live according to the practices of their own communities has to 
be respected… individuals should be free to associate, to form communities and to 
live by the terms of those associations’.59 Therefore, whilst a culture might be 	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  Kukathas, Are there any cultural rights?, (1992) Political theory, Vol 20 1 105, p117	  
58 This reluctance to interfere in culture will be discussed in detail below. It is argued that this is one of 
the key flaws of liberal multicultural models. 
59 Kukathas, Are there any cultural rights?, (1992) Political theory, Vol 20 1 105, p116 
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oppressive by liberal standards, the individual still has the right to choose to belong to 
it.  There can be no assumption that an illiberal practice cannot be consented to.  
 
Finally Kukathas acknowledges the connection between the right of exit and 
individual’s voice within their community. In a situation where there is an alternative 
to the community, that community has to listen more carefully to the voices of its 
members, enhancing their rights as members of the group. Given that the interests of 
an accommodated minority group generally lie in preserving the existence of that 
group, the power of exit translates to the power of influence within the group. This is 
particularly true in the context of women, because it is through women, and their 
children, that cultural membership is preserved, continued and expanded. In certain 
cultures women are viewed as the external representation of the nature of that culture, 
and therefore their continued membership is of perhaps even greater interest to the 
minority community as a whole than that of the dominant groups within that minority. 
Enabling oppressed minorities within minorities to leave their community and 
renounce membership of the associations that oppress them provides them the ability 
to exert influence within that association. If the choice to exit is viable and realistic, 
then it creates what might be considered a ‘market’ element, meaning that the 
minority group has to compete to be an attractive option, rather than merely retaining 
members by default.60 
 
Criticisms of the ‘Exit Option’ 
 
Whilst it is undeniable that the legal right to renounce membership of a cultural 
community is positive in that it allows the individual a measure of autonomy, it is 
generally acknowledged that the idea of exit rights as effective protection against in-
group subordination or maltreatment is inadequate. In some of its manifestations, such 
as Kukathas’s second argument above, the exit rights narrative is closely connected to 
the idea of ‘implied consent’. It assumes that if a vulnerable or even abused individual 
has not actively sought to remove him or herself from the context in which they are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 A viable exit, in this context, gives voice to the otherwise oppressed internal minorities. This will be 
addressed further in the final section.  
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being harmed, then their consent is implicit. 61 Fernandez points out that assumptions 
such as these stem from the liberal conception of cultures as voluntary associations. 
This fails to take into account the fact that ‘nomoi groups, like states, ultimately 
acquire the majority of their members by birth instead of through adult choice’.62 
Cultural groups are not just associations, but often crucial parts of the individual’s 
nomos. Rejection of membership of the group may not be possible without the loss of 
the individual’s identity. Further, in the case of immigrant groups, vulnerable 
individuals may not have sufficient connections outside of their cultural group, nor 
language skills, to be able realistically to exit the community.63  
 
Even Kukathas has recognised that the exit option is ‘insufficient to ensure any kind 
of freedom from oppression since it is precisely the most vulnerable members of such 
communities who would find exit most difficult and costly’.64 Vulnerable members 
who might wish to utilise the option of exit are more likely to be those who would 
have the least ability to survive out with their cultural environment. Women, as a 
particularly vulnerable group, are often oppressed in such a way that limits their 
ability to become independent, both personally and economically. Okin explores this 
idea at length and describes three particular ways in which cultural factors affect 
women’s realistic right to exit. Firstly cultural practices are often manifested in 
education. Demands for separate faith schools in the United Kingdom, and for 
particular educational exemptions for minority groups, give the minority group a large 
degree of control over the education of children. According to Okin, this poses a 
difficulty because of the lack of education that is offered to girls, and also the content 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Shachar notes that this doctrine has roots in archaic laws on subjects such as domestic abuse and 
marital rape. 
62 Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions, p46 
63 Albert Hirschman examined the relationship between voice and exit in his 1970 book ‘Exit, Voice 
and Loyalty: response to decline in firms, organisations and states’ (Harvard University Press, 1970). 
Although largely dealing with voice and exit in a consumer setting, Hirschman does touch upon the 
importance of this distinction in a social organizations, where he believes that ‘exit is ordinarily 
unthinkable, though not always wholly impossible, from such primordial human groupings as family, 
tribe, church and state. The principal way for the individual member to register his dissatisfaction with 
the way things are going in these organisations is normally to make his voice heard in some fashion.’ 
p76  
64 Kukathas, ‘Cultural toleration’, (1997) NOMOS 39 69, p87 
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of that which they do receive. Secondly, early or involuntary arranged marriage has 
the effect of tying women or girls to their cultural community both personally and 
economically.  Okin believes that as women are seen as a means of preserving the 
culture, both symbolically and biologically, they are pressured into having children in 
order to ensure cultural survival. At this point, as mothers, they become complicit in 
the cultural manipulation and socialisation of their children.65 Finally Okin notes that 
the entire process of socialisation within a minority culture that is oppressive towards 
women undermines the self-esteem of those women, meaning that they are unable 
realistically to forge a life for themselves out with that community.  
 
 
In terms of the exit option, Shachar offers a less sensationalist critique, explaining that 
currently ‘the right of exit argument suggests that an injured insider should be the one 
to abandon the very centre of her life, family, and community. This ‘solution’ never 
considers that obstacles such as economic hardship, lack of education, skills 
deficiencies or emotional distress may make exit all but impossible for some’.66 In 
this critique she argues that although the idea of exit is important, and should not be 
dispensed with, more needs to be done to consider how such an exit is enabled. A 
similar viewpoint is expressed by Weinstock, who suggests that exit rights make 
vulnerable members pay a very high price for the repressiveness of their group.67 
Whilst it may be true that the right to leave gives oppressed members more of a voice 
within their community, it would still come at a huge cost to the member. The 
minority group might lose an individual, but the individual loses their entire 
community. If that is not viewed as a realistic option by the minority group, then no 
voice is gained from threatening it.  
 
The second problem that Shachar sees with the ‘exit option’ is that it is final. The idea 
of the non-interventionist model of accommodation, as advocated by Kukathas, 
means that exit is essentially the only choice available to the oppressed, rather than a 
last resort. A woman whose rights are being abused by the minority group to which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 See Okin, Is multiculturalism bad for women?, p12 
66 Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions, p41 
67 Weinstock, ‘Liberalism, multiculturalism and the problem of internal minorities’, p248 
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she belongs has to choose between the ‘implicit consent’ to those abuses, and total 
abandonment of the community (assuming that this is even possible).  Shachar 
surmises that ‘according to this logic, once individuals enter (or choose to remain 
within) minority communities, they are presumed to have relinquished the set of 
rights and protections granted them by virtue of their citizenship’.68  
The dismissal of the importance of culture implied by this apparent ultimatum is 
antithetical to the entire liberal argument in favour of multiculturalism. Liberal 
multiculturalism supports group rights and differentiated citizenship because of the 
crucial role that culture plays in the life of the individual. If a theory of liberal 
multiculturalism relies on the exit option as its primary safeguard against in-group 
subordination then it fails to achieve this aim, and could even be said to create a 
situation where individuals must choose between culture and liberal values.  
 
 
External Critiques 
 
The external critiques of multiculturalism pick up on this contradiction, and examine 
the desirability of any commitment to multiculturalism. Under this head of argument 
it is often suggested that by employing multicultural policies, allowing cultural 
exemptions or legalising difference in any way, cultural identities become ‘hardened’ 
into political categories. Fossilising cultural differences in this way perpetuates 
inequality. The argument is summarised by Kymlicka: 
“Multiculturalism may be intended to encourage people to share their 
distinctive customs, but the very idea that each group has its own distinctive 
customs ignores processes of cultural adaptation, mixing and melange, and 
renders invisible emerging cultural commonalities, thereby potentially 
reinforcing perceptions of minorities as eternally ‘other’.” 
 
Although the ultimate suggestion of all the external critiques is the same, in that they 
argue against multicultural policies that categorise individuals, it is approached from 
several different angles.  
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Brian Barry’s ‘Culture and Equality’ 
 
Brian Barry’s much discussed book Culture and Equality is framed as a challenge to 
multicultural theory, and forms a key part of the external critique, attacking 
multicultural theory from a variety of standpoints. Ultimately Barry advocates the 
adoption of policies that aim to ‘privatise difference’ however it is his discussion of 
the more ‘conventional’ approaches to multiculturalism that is most relevant to the 
current project. 
 
Whilst criticised widely due to his propensity to make sweeping statements such as 
‘multicultural policies are not in general well designed to advance the values of 
liberty and equality, and… the implementation of such policies tends to make a retreat 
from both’, Barry makes several important observations about the theoretical 
shortcomings of multiculturalism.  
Firstly he makes the point that far from reducing inequality, most multicultural 
policies seem to be designed to preserve the factors that have led to that inequality. In 
this sense the distinction between choice and opportunity becomes important.  
“Members of minority cultures may, indeed, suffer from a paucity of resources 
or opportunities, but the case for culture-based special rights does not depend 
on its being so. Rather, the argument is that, even where resources and 
opportunities are equal, the members of a group are entitled to special rights if 
their distinctive culture puts them in a position such that they are in some way 
less well placed to benefit from the exercise of the rights that provide the 
standard resources and opportunities than are others.”69 
This has the effect that whilst all citizens/ members of a society have the same 
opportunities available to them, they are restricted in their ability to choose these 
opportunities by their culture. ‘The critical distinction is between limits on the range 
of opportunities open to people and limits on the choices that they make from within a 
certain range of opportunities’.70 In terms of the autonomy arguments that are put 
forward in favour of differentiated citizenship, this suggests that the limitations 
should be considered to be part of the private affiliation that an individual has with 	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their (supposedly cultural) group, rather than any societal inequality for which the 
state has responsibility.  
 
Barry further suggests that there is some disagreement between proponents of 
multiculturalism as to whether they are attempting to give members of minority 
cultures effective equality of opportunity and of choice, whilst retaining their cultural 
‘distinctiveness’, or whether ‘the objective of special treatment for members of 
disadvantaged groups is to make the need for that special treatment disappear as 
rapidly as possible’.71 In the case of the first objective, any special rights that were 
granted to a minority population would have to be granted on a theoretically 
permanent basis. Doing so would create a permanent difference in treatment between 
members of cultural groups, and therefore mean that minority groups were 
considered, interminably, to be something ‘other’ than the majority, rather than as an 
important and equally worthwhile component of the same society. In the case of the 
second objective, the effective levelling of the playing field would likely mean that 
those belonging to previously disadvantaged minority groups no longer possessed the 
characteristics, or ‘cultural distinctiveness’ which necessitated the differential 
treatment in the first place. In this instance the well-meaning multicultural policy in 
fact leads to accelerated de facto assimilation.  
 
For Barry therefore, the current approaches to multiculturalism necessitate a choice 
between the perpetuation of difference, and the erosion of difference. There is no 
middle ground and, possibly more importantly, there seems to be no flexibility. Barry 
suggests that these approaches constitute an either/or approach to difference, one 
which is at odds with the nature and flexibility of cultures.  
 
 
In terms of self-government rights and devolution to national minorities or indigenous 
populations, Barry urges further caution, due to the asymmetrical nature of such 
power structures. In such situations, members of the national minority retain a vote in 
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the state elections, and representatives from the nation’s territory vote in the 
parliament on issues that do not affect their constituencies at all:72 
‘The complaint, dismissed by Kymlicka, that asymmetry ‘create[s] two classes 
of citizens’ seems to me completely valid. On one side, there are those citizens 
who determine their own affairs and in some matters play a part in 
determining the affairs of everybody else as well. On the other side, there are 
those citizens who determine their own affairs in some matters and in other 
matters are unable to determine their own affairs because some other people 
who have no business taking part in decisions on them have a right to do so.’ 
 
Barry is of the opinion that the only country which has so far avoided this difficulty in 
the decision making process is Belgium, divided as it is into Flemish and French, with 
relative autonomy for each group, and debate and bargaining over state-wide policy 
and practices. Not entirely willing to concede that this system works he adds, ‘the 
endless process of haggling that is Belgian politics is so nauseating to all concerned 
that it is widely thought that the country would already have broken up if it were not 
for the problem posed by Brussels – a Francophone enclave in Flemish territory that 
is too big a prize for either side to be willing to relinquish.’73  
 
 
As a supporter of the privatisation of difference, and the pursuit of difference blind 
policies save in very exceptional circumstances, Barry concludes that ‘pursuit of the 
multiculturalist agenda makes the achievement of broadly based egalitarian policies 
more difficult in two ways. At the minimum it diverts political effort away from 
universalistic goals. But a more serious problem is that multiculturalism may very 
well destroy the conditions for putting together a coalition in favour of across-the-
board equalisation of opportunities and resources’.74  
 
It might be noted that Shachar heavily criticises Barry for this assessment of 
multiculturalism, suggesting that he is guilty of making value judgements about the 	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merits of other cultures, and as Okin has been accused of doing, ultimately regarding 
them as intrinsically inferior to the majority culture. For Shachar, Barry makes a key 
error in considering the accommodation of diversity quite apart from any 
contemporary developments in concept and reach of citizenship: 
‘Barry hardly pays any attention to the relationship between the rise of the 
‘politics of difference’ and the universal expansion of citizenship, even though 
this important line of inquiry might furnish strong arguments for the 
proponents of the external critique of multiculturalism. One could argue for 
example, that democracy (here treated as universal suffrage) has become a 
catalysing force behind the recent claims for multicultural accommodation; 
since perhaps for the first time in modern history, members of non-dominant 
communities are now treated as full citizens with entrenched political rights. 
Under such circumstances, we might further argue that, once the fire of inter-
community conflict has been lit – it can prove much harder to control than 
under non-democratic conditions.’75  
 
Further Barry himself acknowledges that his assessment may not be considered 
entirely fair, given that there is a wide variety of opinion even amongst ‘avowed 
multiculturalists’ and none personally subscribes to each of the opinions that he has 
attributed to them as a whole. It is suggested that that is not necessarily a reason to 
discount or discredit Barry’s criticism however, because whilst there might not be a 
single ‘avowed multiculturalist’ who subscribes to all of the arguments he attacked, 
the discussion goes a long way to revealing the huge discrepancies between the 
purported ‘ideal’ of multiculturalism, and the implementation of multicultural theory.   
 
 
Universalism, categorisation and differentiation 
 
The adoption of multicultural policies, such as the acceptance of cultural defences 
discussed above, or exemptions from legislation concerning dress, is also considered 	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in the external critiques as they can pose a challenge to the idea of universalism. 
Although the aim of many of these policies is to give specific rights to specific groups 
that are intended to compensate for the restrictions that that group’s culture create on 
the exercise of otherwise uniform rights, they are in fact better tailored towards an 
aim of removing inequality by removing difference, as Barry suggested above. 
Phillips points out that ‘universalism is more closely associated with the idea that all 
individuals should have the same rights or protections or entitlements than the idea 
that all individuals should end up the same.’76  
Further, having different laws for different people requires categorisation and 
differentiation. Difficulties arise in attempting to classify people who might qualify 
for differential treatment, and this creates a situation where people have to make a 
choice between being officially affiliated to a minority culture, or to the supposed 
majority culture or status quo.77  
As articulated by the post-colonial feminists, this can lead to people ‘re-discovering’ 
their cultural background when it suits them, even though they may have almost 
completely assimilated/ integrated to the majority culture in other respects.  
 
 The demarcating function of some multicultural policies creates tension between 
different cultural groups, and in some circumstances can lead to there being a 
perceived hierarchy between these groups. If the ultimate goal of the multiculturalist 
is, as it is assumed to be, total equality between groups and individuals within those 
groups, then emphasising difference in any way must be counterproductive, 
highlighting the perception of minority cultures as a perpetual and, as I shall argue, 
typically negative ‘other’. 
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Against the division of critiques 
 
At this point it might be appropriate to critically consider the division of these 
critiques of multiculturalism into the ‘internal’ and ‘external’. Shachar provides a 
useful categorisation that undeniably aids in the organisation and understanding of the 
various objections to contemporary multicultural policies. However it is suggested 
that by aiming to divide the critiques in this way, Shachar unintentionally obscures 
some of the similarities between them, which can provide a valuable insight into the 
real concerns raised.  
 
The basic distinctions between the critiques, as highlighted by Shachar, are that the 
internal typically focuses on the negative effects that accommodation can have on 
individual members of a minority group, whereas the external considers the 
consequences for intra-group dynamics.78 Further, Shachar asserts that in general 
proponents of external critiques fundamentally disagree with multicultural theory and 
those proponents of internal critiques tend to support the accommodation of 
difference through multicultural policy, objecting rather to the particular way in 
which it is managed.79  
 
In reality these distinctions are not black and white and many of the key points raised 
are common to both categories. Consider the perception of minority cultures. Both 
groups raise arguments concerning the reinforcement of ideas of ‘otherness’. On the 
external side, this is discussed in relation to the use of specific legislation that 
highlights the differences between cultures rather than similarities, and therefore 
promotes the categorisation of individuals along cultural lines. The internal critique 
considers this in the context of cultural defences, where the implicit suggestion is that 
minority cultures are so different from the majority culture that they can justify acts 
which to the majority would be wrong or even abhorrent. Further, proponents of both 
internal and external critiques are concerned with the perception of minorities being 	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79 It might be argued that in fact the ‘division’ between ultimate support for and opposition to 
differentiated citizenship or multicultural policies is largely due to the personal bias of each writer, 
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‘negative’. The internal critique (perhaps unintentionally) concerns itself with this 
view by highlighting the plight of vulnerable individuals within protected minority 
cultures. This demonstrates the negative consequences of giving group rights, and 
suggests that the minority cultures tend towards illiberal values and particularly 
towards sexism, and by doing this lends itself (presumably unintentionally) to the 
conclusion that minority cultures are somehow not to be trusted. In terms of the 
external critique, this is highlighted by the preference towards assimilation rather than 
cultural accommodation, or the recommendation that culture be confined to the 
private sphere. The implicit suggestion is that the majority culture is correct, and 
minority cultures should be considered of minor importance and/or relegated to being 
practised far away from public life.  
 
Whilst these conclusions on the perception of other cultures are usually not argued 
explicitly, it is interesting to note the commonality between the critiques. The idea of 
minority cultures as a ‘negative other’ has been suggested to be an inevitable 
consequence of comparison: 
 
‘What is another culture? Is the notion of a distinct culture (or race, or religion 
or civilisation) a useful one, or does it always get involved either in self-
congratulation (when one discusses one’s own) or hostility and aggression 
(when one discusses the ‘other’)?’80 
 
Many of the problems that multicultural theory faces flow from the difficulties in 
defining a culture, and from the necessity of defining it in relation to the presumed 
majority culture. In doing so, minority cultures are often mischaracterised, and 
through attempting to set out the content of a culture multicultural policies run the 
risk of essentialising cultures, not only by ‘choosing’ which aspects merit 
accommodation, but also by denying them the natural process of development and 
adaptation inherent to any culture or society.  
 
The internal and external critiques both consider this problem of concretisation; the 
internal from the standpoint of individuals who are effectively denied their citizenship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Edward Said, Orientalism, (Modern Classics edn, Penguin Books, 2003) p325, original emphasis 
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rights by the adoption of policies that aim to preserve a group’s perceived cultural 
attributes. A frequently cited example concerns membership to the Native American 
Santa Clara Pueblo tribe. Members of the tribe are able to access specific healthcare 
facilities. The case of Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez examined the denial of access to 
emergency healthcare on the basis that the mother of the child in need of care had 
married outside of the tribe. As a result, although the children of the marriage had 
been raised within the community and their mother was a full blood member of the 
tribe, the children were not granted membership. Were the father to have been a 
member of the tribe, and the mother not, the children would still have been entitled to 
membership. This decision was upheld by the US Supreme Court on the basis that the 
membership rules, although obviously discriminatory, were crucial to the tribe’s 
cultural survival.81,82  
 
 
The external standpoint considers the concretisation of culture from the perspective of 
division, in that it is perceived to cause problems in achieving ultimate equality 
between cultures. As discussed above, Barry highlights the problem that legislation 
that aims to reduce inequality relies on the conditions creating the initial inequality to 
persist for its continued effectiveness. In this way, multicultural policies rely on a 
fixed conception of minority cultures at odds with the desired equality of personal 
choice and opportunity that they purport to desire.  
 
Finally, both the internal and external critiques suggest that one of the most difficult 
problems facing multicultural theory is the strategic adoption or manipulation of 
culture, be it by individuals, the minority group, or the state themselves. Almost all of 
the texts referred to in this section touch upon this idea; however none appears to 
examine it in much detail.  
 
The similarities between the two categories of critique highlighted by Shachar 
illustrate the deeper issues facing multicultural theory. The ‘fall’ narrative has been 
damning in its criticism of policies adopted by various states in the name of protecting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49 (1978) 82	  See	  discussion	  in	  Shachar,	  Multicultural	  Jurisdictions,	  p18	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and promoting cultural diversity, however, on closer examination (and partly because 
of the division between internal and external) some of this criticism can be seen as 
superficial, failing to grapple adequately with and in some cases even to identify the 
key issues discussed above.  
 
Qualifications to the ‘Multicultural backlash’ 
 
Whether individual writers believe that multiculturalism itself is desirable or not, 
there appears to have been agreement from most schools of thought that 
multiculturalism as it is currently approached, in terms of minority rights and 
differentiated citizenship, is not working.  
 
In spite of this ‘surprising consensus’, Kymlicka points out that there has only really 
been a retreat from policies of multiculturalism in respect of immigrant populations. 
There remain extensive and arguably expanding protections and provisions for 
indigenous and national minorities in most Western countries.83  
This, according to Kymlicka, refutes the presumption that the move away from 
multiculturalism is based on a reassertion of the idea that ethnicity belongs in the 
private sphere.84 85Even in terms of immigrant populations, the ‘retreat’ is by no 
means uniform, and is based on many different factors.  
In fact, Meer and Modood make the point that in Britain it can be considered that 
there has been a ‘re-balancing’ of the principles of multiculturalism that are in 
operation, rather than a ‘backlash’, because “accepting that there has been a 
movement does not require us to accept that this has been a retreat.”86 
Kymlicka therefore argues that the master narrative on what is sometimes termed the 
‘multiculturalism backlash’ is mistaken in that it ‘a) mischaracterises the nature of the 
experiments in multiculturalism that have been undertaken in the past 40 years, b) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Kymlicka, ‘The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism?’, p104 
84 c Barry, Culture and Equality 
85 It might be considered, however, that the fact that certain texts fail to specify that they are largely 
concerned with immigrant populations, and not with indigenous or national minorities, does not 
devalue their contribution to the debate. To rely on this error to undermine or refute their arguments 
might even be considered an attempt to avoid interaction with their content. 
86 Meer and Modood, ‘The multicultural state we’re in’ (2009) Political Studies 57/3 473 p483 
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exaggerates the extent to which they have been abandoned and c) misidentifies the 
genuine difficulties and limitations they have encountered’.  
The typical criticism that multicultural policies prevent the natural evolution of 
culture is inaccurate, he says, because an understanding of the necessity of cultural 
change has always been part of the multicultural project. Kymlicka also spends some 
time lamenting the existence of the so-called ‘3S’ approach to multiculturalism.87 In 
this manifestation, multiculturalism refers to the symbolic celebration of perceived 
‘cultural markers’ in a way that trivialises the deeper issue at stake. Kymlicka 
believes that this approach ignores issues of political and economic inequality and 
‘even with respect to the (legitimate) goal of promoting greater understanding of 
cultural differences, the focus on celebrating ‘authentic’ cultural practices that are 
‘unique’ to each group is potentially dangerous.’88 Kymlicka suggests that the 
multicultural backlash has largely occurred in relation to this type of ‘Disneyfication’ 
multiculturalism, and therefore much of this criticism should not be taken as criticism 
of what he perceives as the more noble forms of multiculturalism.89  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 ‘Saris, samosas and steel drums’ as coined by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown in ‘After Multiculturalism’ 
(2000) Foreign Policy Centre 
88 Kymlicka, Multiculturalism: success, failure and future, p4 
89 It might be suggested however, that Kymlicka is too hasty to dismiss criticisms that relate to this 
‘Disneyfication’ and that this is reminiscent of his reaction to criticisms that fail to specify that the 
decline has largely been in terms of immigrant multiculturalism. In his defence of multiculturalism, 
Kymlicka is overly selective in the criticism that he wishes to address; dismissing critiques that he feels 
are not aimed precisely enough, rather than considering their merits in spite of this perceived flaw. 
Further, in the context of ‘3S’ multiculturalism, it would seem reasonable to conclude that criticism of 
a caricature of multiculturalism is still legitimate criticism of multiculturalism, although it may need to 
be interpreted in a more nuanced manner. The suggestion that multiculturalism in its current 
incarnation can tend towards the concretisation of cultures is by no means a criticism that applies only 
to models of ‘3S’ multiculturalism. The granting of differentiated citizenship rights to minority groups 
relies on the received account of a culture as shaped by those who (generally speaking) have power 
within it, and whose interests therefore are best served by the maintenance of the status quo.  Further, 
as suggested by Barry, concessions made to minority populations are often made on the basis that the 
minority group should not have to alter itself, necessarily these policies rely on the persistence of the 
initial equality, and therefore the preservation of the minority culture as is. Whilst these criticisms may 
be subtler than those directed at the ‘3S’ model of multiculturalism, they are still identifiable as the 
same ones. A sensationalist critique of a sensationalist version of multiculturalism is not necessarily 
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In general, in order for multiculturalism to work effectively, Kymlicka is of the 
opinion that two essential pre-conditions must be met. Firstly there must be a ‘de-
securitisation’ of state-minority relations.90 Securitisation of relations occurs when the 
state distrusts certain minority groups, or fears that they might collaborate with an 
enemy in co-ordinating an attack. Historically this would occur where a national 
minority was perceived as disloyal and likely to side with a neighbouring state in the 
event of an attack. Kymlicka acknowledges that this is largely a non-issue in modern 
Western democracies, due to the lack of neighbouring enemies and of hostility 
between states and national minorities or indigenous populations. Whilst he does 
point out that there are potential long-distance threats, such as Soviet communism in 
the past and Islamic jihadism today, he suggests that this in itself is not sufficient to 
suggest the securitisation of state - Islamic relations.  
The second pre-condition for effective multiculturalism is the protection of human 
rights.  Once again Kymlicka considers this to be a non-issue as regards national and 
indigenous minorities, and largely so in terms of immigrant groups.  
Whilst attempting to offer a rational explanation as to the perceived ‘fall’ of 
multiculturalism, Kymlicka himself appears to become confused as, after so 
concluding that both pre-conditions are satisfied to the extent that multiculturalism 
may thrive, he makes the slightly incongruous statement that ‘these two factors… 
help explain the partial retreat from multiculturalism in some countries in relation to 
recent Muslim immigrants, who are often seen as both disloyal and illiberal’.91 This 
sentiment is echoed by Meer and Modood:  
 
‘… Muslims are currently perceived to be – often uniquely – in contravention 
of liberal discourses of individual rights and secularism… and is exempliﬁed 
by the way in which visible Muslim practices such as veiling have in public 
discourses been reduced to and conﬂated with alleged Muslim practices such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
without use, indeed through the amplification of the issues it becomes in some ways easier to focus on 
the underlying problems.   
 
 
90 Kymlicka, The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism, p106 
91 Kymlicka, The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism, p108 
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as forced marriages, female genital mutilation, a rejection of positive law in 
favour of criminal sharia law and so on. This suggests a radical ‘otherness’ 
about Muslims and an illiberality about multiculturalism, and, since the latter 
is alleged to license these practices, opposition to the practice, it is argued, 
necessarily invalidates the policy.’92 
 
The authors go on to speculate that the ‘backlash’ against immigrant multiculturalism 
is in fact due to a general feeling that British multiculturalism is in part responsible 
for contemporary national security issues.93 Whilst consistent with Kymlicka’s 
conception of the securitisation of state - minority relations, it has been argued that 
the ‘failure’ of multiculturalism is much more fundamental than simple statements of 
suspicion being directed at Islamic populations might suggest.  
In this respect Shachar offers a convincing critical analysis of the failure of 
multicultural theories, although she is not so careful to emphasise that the failure is 
largely only in respect of immigrant accommodation.94 Shachar labels her critique of 
multiculturalism as a ‘methodological/ casuistic’ one, which offers four main claims. 
Firstly she points out that, due to many of the multicultural theories having been set 
out and studied by political and legal theorists, rather than sociologists, “major works 
in the field have relied on ad hoc examples and stylised hard cases to illustrate (their 
claims)” rather than any extensive statistical studies, therefore their ‘empirical rigor’ 
is called in to question.95 Secondly Shachar observes that there is a similar lack of 
regard to specific regional and national contexts. The great diversity of conditions and 
situations even across Europe is often reduced to a ‘Western’ prototype, the analysis 
of which, according to Shachar, is of little help or meaning. Furthermore, she cites a 
‘dearth of definitional clarity’96 in the field, meaning that words such as ‘culture’ and 
‘identity’ are deployed in confusing and often conflicting senses, significantly 
complicating an already confusing field.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Meer and Modood, ‘The Multicultural State We’re In’ p481 
93 Meer and Modood,‘The Multicultural State We’re In” p481 
94 Shachar, ‘Two Critiques of Multiculturalism’ 
95 Shachar believes that Barry is particularly guilty of this. 
96 Shachar, ‘Two Critiques of Multiculturalism’, p290 
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The final claim cited by Shachar is constituted by the cumulative effect of the first 
three, and one that she believes to be most damning of all: 
“… (Multicultural scholars) have gotten the order of things fundamentally 
wrong. Here, the main assertion is that most authors in the first and second 
wave of literature based their theoretical edifice on the assumption that culture 
is the cause of inter-communal tensions – rather than a political resource that 
can be effectively mobilized; or, in other cases, an outcome or reflection of on-
going power struggles and identity reconfigurations.”97 
 
In other words the way in which multiculturalism has been approached, lends itself to 
manipulation, and thus perpetuates that which it aims to remedy. The strategic 
adoption of ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ on the part of minority groups, allows these 
groups to ‘extract greater political concessions from the majority’.98  
 
 
The key failings of liberal multicultural models 
 
 
From the above discussion of the narrative of the ‘fall’ of multiculturalism it is clear 
that there have been many different accusations levelled at the body of theory. In spite 
of the best efforts of Kymlicka to minimise their perceived impact, and of Shachar to 
shift the focus away from these critiques towards a new angle, the presence of such 
damning criticism cannot be ignored.  
Although the categorisation of the critiques into ‘internal’ and ‘external’ is helpful in 
many ways, not least for organising this discussion, it serves to obscure some of the 
important arguments that recur on both sides of this divide.  
 
Parekh is of the opinion that the difficulties that have faced liberal models of 
multiculturalism were inevitable. ‘Although (a liberal approach to multiculturalism) 
takes us in the right direction, it contains unresolved contradictions and is too 
committed to some form of liberal monism to provide a coherent response to cultural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Shachar, ‘Two Critiques of Multiculturalism’, p290 original emphasis 
98 Ibid. p291 
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diversity.’ Given that liberalism began ‘as a doctrine stressing the contingency of and 
abstracting away ethnic, religious, cultural and other differences’ Parekh suggests that 
it is hardly surprising that liberalism ‘faces acute structural difficulties getting these 
differences back into its views of man and politics.’ 99 
 
It might be argued that, in practice, there are two key failings of the current liberal 
multicultural models: firstly there is a reluctance on the part of the state to be seen to 
make any statement or judgement about the ‘value’ of a minority culture. This has led 
to an almost ‘hands-off’ approach being adopted, which fails to adequately protect 
internal minorities, and facilitates the manipulation of multicultural policies. Secondly 
the preoccupation with respect for difference has led to minority cultures being 
essentialised and concretised in a way that perpetuates existing power hierarchies 
within these groups. These two key faults are entirely connected, the first leading to 
the second, and the second perpetuating the first. It is crucial to examine these two 
faults in more detail, before embarking on the project of reconstructing 
multiculturalism. 
 
 
Evaluating cultures – the hands-off approach 
 
There is a perception in liberal multiculturalism that it is impossible to completely 
understand a culture from an external perspective. Only those who belong to it 
appreciate the content and value of a culture, and those who belong to one culture are 
not in a position to judge the merits of the content of any other. Any attempt to assess 
the merits of a cultural claim is open to accusations of being supremacist or 
imperialist. Given the liberal multicultural focus on the individual’s ‘right’ to culture, 
it is understandable that these accusations are feared.  
 
Cultural Defences and the reluctance to interfere  
 
This reluctance to evaluate cultural practices opens the way for individuals and 
groups to manipulate the state by playing the ‘culture card’. Lack of knowledge about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, p12  
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most minority cultures plays into the hands of those who wish to excuse or justify 
their behaviour. There are several ways in which this can be manipulated, however 
the most commonly discussed is the use of cultural defences, therefore they will be 
discussed here as an illustration of the need to allow and support scrutiny of cultural 
practices.100  
  
As suggested above, cultural defences often do not represent the actual state of culture 
in a given country or society. Rather, the defence plays on the ignorance of the 
domestic court systems, and their desire to appear to be considerate and understanding 
of minority needs.101  
 
In the context of the feminist critiques of multiculturalism, the objections to cultural 
defences are based (mainly although not exclusively) on the potentially damaging 
effects that they can have on vulnerable internal minorities. The external critiques 
object to their use on the grounds that they undermine the principal of legal 
universalism. Cultural defences are used below as an illustration of the difficulties 
that can arise when there is an over-emphasis on a ‘right to culture’. 102,103 
 
By presenting judges with defences based on an expressed statement of ‘culture’, 
individuals give judges a decision to make based on their understanding (or lack 
thereof) of that intimated culture. The idea of ‘this is how things are done in my 
culture’ is incredibly dangerous for a number of reasons. Firstly it exoticises minority 
culture in a way that is not conducive to social cohesion, suggesting that it operates on 
entirely different paradigms from that of the majority culture. This concern is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 The use of cultural defences plays a part in both the internal and external critiques of 
multiculturalism, a further demonstration that the division serves to obscure the commonalities of the 
critiques.  101	  See Paul J. Magnarella ‘Justice in a Culturally Pluralistic Society: the Culture Defense on 
Trial’(1991) The Journal of Ethnic Studies 19, 65-84	  
102 It should be noted that there is also extensive argument surrounding the use of ‘culture’ as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing, rather than establishing guilt, however this will not be discussed in 
detail. See Phillips, ‘When culture means gender’, p516 and Doriane Lambelet Coleman 
‘Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: the Liberal’s Dilemma’(1996) Columbia Law 
Review 95, 1093-1166. 
103 The frequency with which cultural defences are used as an illustration in discussions about 
multiculturalism is perhaps interesting in itself. Cultural defences tend to be used infrequently and are 
usually dealt with appropriately – the focus on their potential to cause harm is perhaps a confirmation 
of Shachar’s criticism that much of the literature on multiculturalism relies on ad hoc examples rather 
than statistical and empirical evidence.  
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considered by the internal critique discussed above. Secondly, given that judges will 
tend to come from the majority culture, they will not necessarily be (nor can they be 
expected to be) entirely familiar with all minority practices. Armed simply with the 
knowledge that ‘cultural sensitivity’ is important and desirable, and that cultures 
should not be judged externally, they are at the mercy of those who explain this 
‘culture’ to them. If an individual and an ‘expert’ attest to the fact that culture played 
a mitigating role in the actions of the accused, a judge can find it difficult to dismiss 
this out of hand, regardless of the ‘actual’ situation in (for example) the accused’s 
country of origin.  
 
The use of cultural defences creates an us/them dynamic, in which the judge is usually 
on the opposite side from the defendant. In this situation ‘judges seem unwilling to 
grasp the true complexity of cultural phenomena, whether in ‘other’ cultures or in 
their own. The result is that judges often construct for themselves an unhappy choice 
between accepting a culture while looking down on it for some problematic (and 
possibly criminal) practice, or requiring assimilation to some construction of 
(‘Canadian’) norms.’104 
It is argued that this assessment is perhaps overly critical of judges, as it does not 
adequately consider the difficulty of the position that they are placed in when asked to 
assess the validity of a cultural defence. It is true however that in effect a choice has 
to be made between accepting that the conduct of the defendant was in compliance 
with his own culture, and as such can be seen to be mitigated, or deciding that, 
regardless of the minority culture perspective, the conduct is contrary to the majority 
cultural (and therefore legal) norms and should be judged as such. It has been widely 
pointed out that an essential difficulty in the consideration of other cultures within the 
legal system is the erroneous perception that the legal system is devoid of culture.   
 
The difficulty in asking judges to make a decision about culture is that they are not 
qualified to do it. Having no knowledge of the minority culture they rely on the 
statements of ‘experts’ as to what a ‘normal’ reaction to a situation would be. It has 
been pointed out that ‘the cultural rights argument works best for those cultures that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Sonia Lawrence, ‘Cultural (In)Sensitivity: the dangers of a simplistic approach to culture in the 
courtroom’, (2001) Canada J. Women & L 13 107 p112 
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most (Americans) know comparatively little about’, and the same is true for cultural 
defences. Cultural defences are most successful in cases concerning cultures which 
‘in our ignorance we can imagine as stable, timeless, ancient, lacking in internal 
conflict, pre-modern…’. This in turn makes it more difficult to justify ruling against 
cultural defences, because it seems to be an interference in an established practice.105 
Ultimately the danger is that such defences can lead to the accused being seen as a 
sympathetic figure, and the original victim becomes secondary to the ‘cultural 
misunderstanding’ that led to the court case.  
 
Whether the defence is successful or not, the highlighted practices generally come to 
lead perceptions of that culture as a whole. Given that cultural defences are only 
argued when there is a supposedly mitigating factor to an otherwise illegal act, the 
perception of the minority is overwhelmingly damaged by the pleading of such a 
defence. As Lawrence asserts ‘there is something about looking at ‘difference’ that 
seems to make only difference visible.’106  
 
There are several arguments for allowing individuals to plead cultural defences, and 
some of these have been mentioned above. The argument most relevant to the current 
discussion, however, is articulated by Leti Volpp. Volpp is of the opinion that cultural 
information may indeed be useful in providing a subjective assessment of the 
accused’s state of mind at the time of an offence, if there are circumstances in which 
the typical prejudices or beliefs of a community go some way to explaining (rather 
than justifying) that person’s actions. The difficulties in defining and articulating such 
information are addressed: 
 
‘Even when we attempt to use cultural information to explain an individual’s 
oppressions or her state of mind, we are forced to label and define, in other 
words, to essentialise certain behaviour as ‘cultural’. This can be done in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Katha Pollitt, ‘Whose Culture?’, in Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, p29 
106 This is possibly at odds with the post-colonial feminist conclusions on the use of cultural defences, 
which suggest that they in fact only work when they resonate with a hidden prejudice within the 
majority culture. However (regardless of the validity of these claims) it is argued that simply because a 
prejudice may be privately held by majority culture members, the public expression of that prejudice 
does not become any less shocking or negative.  
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spirit of what might be called ‘strategic essentialism’ – consciously choosing 
to essentialise a particular community for the purpose of a specific political 
goal. Strategic essentialism ideally should be undertaken by the affected 
community, which is best suited to undertake the process of selecting the 
appropriate circumstances in which to offer cultural information.’107 
 
This view is problematic. Firstly, given that this ‘essentialism’ is ‘strategic’, it must 
be asked what this strategy aims to achieve. Volpp asserts that the aim is a specific 
political goal (which, she argues is the ‘essence of identity politics – naming and 
categorizing oneself as a means of identifying interests for purposes of 
empowerment’108) but in this case, whose goal is it? The goal of the state -presumably 
to promote social cohesion, cultural respect and uphold justice - or the goal of the 
minority community - to achieve greater recognition for and perhaps leniency towards 
their specific culture? If it is the goal of the state, then why would it be best achieved 
by allowing a minority community to decide on what (presumably selective) cultural 
information should be divulged or ‘officially’ recognised? And if it is the goal of the 
minority community, then how is such ‘strategic essentialism’ able to be viewed as a 
positive step in the wider interests of the population? The ‘essence’ of identity 
politics, as it is seen by Volpp, is in mobilising a group identity for the benefit of that 
group. The apparent ‘benefit of the group’ in this context however, seems to be to 
diminish their legal responsibility or culpability for otherwise (largely) unjustifiable 
acts. Further, it would seem that this group benefit is at best selective, given the 
impact that cultural defences have on vulnerable members of minority groups.  
 
This has been argued at length in relation to the practice of ‘marriage by capture’ 
which has been recognised as a defence in various cases involving members of the 
Hmong culture in the United States. Although this practice is generally accepted in its 
original (geographical) context, it has been used to justify actions that would 
otherwise constitute kidnap and rape in other jurisdictions.109 In an illustration of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Volpp, ‘(Mis)Identifying Culture : Asian women and the cultural defence’ (1994) Harv. Women’s 
LJ 57, p95 
108 Ibid. p95 fn163 
109 For a detailed discussion see Jennifer Yang, ‘Marriage by capture in the Hmong culture: the legal 
issue of cultural rights versus women’s rights’, (2003) Law & Society Review UCSB 3 39 
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Shachar’s paradox of multicultural vulnerability, the acceptance of marriage by 
capture as a culturally defensible action places those Hmong women who might be 
subject to such ‘capture’ at a disadvantage. Although many Hmong women living in 
other jurisdictions (and perhaps even those who remain in their cultural ‘homeland’) 
wish to move on from the practice, which affords them little or no choice in whom 
they marry, or indeed when, once it is accepted as a cultural practice worthy or 
respect, they are given no protection against it, and as such are denied the freedom 
they would otherwise have, because of their membership of a culture, an aspect of 
which has been ‘strategically essentialised’.  
 
For individuals, the availability of ‘cultural defences’, or of the ability to plead that 
culture was justification for an otherwise illegal act, allows them to manipulate the 
courts’ desire to be seen not to discriminate against or disregard minority cultures. In 
certain contexts, with strategic deployment of the cultural defence, individuals are 
able literally to get away with murder. Not only does a successful cultural defence 
help the accused in that particular case, it sets a precedent for the use of cultural 
defences by others in similar situations. Individuals are therefore able to ‘deploy’ 
culture as an excuse for their behaviour, and to know how likely it is to work. Phillips 
warns against this, and suggests that in this context there is a danger of individuals, 
who may have almost entirely assimilated to the majority culture in other ways, 
‘rediscovering’ their cultural heritage in order to gain the most beneficial outcome 
from a court case. 
Although this suggestion may seem cynical, there is evidence that it is correct. In 
New York, following the infamous case of People v Chen110, there have been fears 
that domestic violence has been legitimised within the Asian-American community: 
 
‘The impact of the trial and probationary sentencing resonated beyond the 
courtroom, sending a message to the wider community. Jian Wan Chen’s life was 
not valued; her life was worth less than other lives; her murderer did not deserve 
punishment in jail. Other Chinese immigrant women living with abuse at the hand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 A Chinese man, who had lived in the United States for several years, killed his ‘adulterous’ wife by 
bludgeoning her with a hammer - following the use of a cultural defence the charge was reduced from 
murder to manslaughter and Chen was sentenced to five years’ probation. 
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of their partners and husbands identified with Jian Wan Chen and clearly 
understood that violence against them by their partners and husbands had the 
implicit approval of the state.  
The Chen decision sent a message to battered Asian women that they had no 
recourse against domestic violence. One battered Chinese woman told a worker at 
the New York Asian Women’s Centre, ‘Even thinking about that case makes me 
afraid. My husband told me: “If this is the kind of sentence you get for killing 
your wife, I could do anything to you. I have the money for a good attorney.’” In 
other words, her husband could afford to hire someone to testify as an expert to 
bolster a ‘cultural defence’ that legitimised his violence.’111 
 
 
Regardless of the validity of the cultural claims behind each instance (because it is 
quite possible that given an individual’s cultural background, they might lack the 
requisite mens rea to be considered guilty of a crime) the danger is that individuals are 
able to manipulate the well-meaning acceptance of cultural defences and use them as 
a way to secure a reduced sentence or even an acquittal, whether or not their cultural 
origin was actually a factor. If individuals know that the penalty for a certain crime 
could be or is likely to be reduced because of their background, then the incentive not 
to commit the crime is similarly reduced.  
 
It is clear from the above that the liberal multicultural reluctance to be seen to 
evaluate cultural practices from an external standpoint can result in great difficulties. 
Vulnerable internal minorities are not protected and general perceptions of minority 
communities are altered by the ‘accepted’ cultural practices that become visible.  
 
Concretising cultural narratives 
 
The concretisation of culture, sometimes tellingly referred to as fossilisation,112 is 
widely seen as a negative phenomenon, and against the natural progression and 
evolution of people and ideas. Societies constantly change, develop and modernise, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Volpp, (Mis) Identifying Culture, pp76-77 112	  For example see Shachar, Two Critiques, p9	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altering their priorities and standards, as well as the roles of individual members.  It is 
argued that this development is crucial to the maintenance of a societal or cultural 
identity: ‘If I am a Jew, I have to recognise that the tradition of Judaism is partly 
constituted by a continuous argument over what it means to be a Jew.’113 Kymlicka 
warns against the concretisation of minority cultures, as a way of reducing and 
belittling their importance and relevance, as well as reinforcing perceptions of ‘other-
ness’ by ‘rendering invisible emerging commonalities.’114 In other words, the very act 
of attempting to define what constitutes a culture renders impossible the development 
that is in fact an essential part of any cultural narrative. The concretisation of culture 
stunts this development resulting in an ‘official’ form of culture increasingly far 
removed from reality, as well as permanently differentiated from surrounding 
cultures.  
 
The above discussion demonstrates the accidental concretisation of cultural practices 
through a hands-off approach, however, it must be considered that there are those who 
are in favour of the status quo, and have an interest in preserving the ‘culture’ as it is 
now. These individuals are often able to influence the cultural narrative that becomes 
concretised, so as to preserve or increase their dominance within the minority: 
 
‘Scholars who investigate ethnic conflicts that have led to outbreaks of inter-
communal violence have in recent years expanded the empirical and narrative 
body of knowledge we possess on the ways in which cultural identity may be 
(ab)used by ‘elites seeking to gain, maintain or increase their hold on political 
power’.’115 
 
This phenomenon is most relevant to the consideration of immigrant cultures, because 
these minorities are most likely to have the opportunity to create a narrative, 
compared to national and indigenous minorities, which have not had a ‘joining point’ 
or time where an official version of their culture can be negotiated.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 A McIntyre, ‘Epistemological Crises, dramatic narrative and the philosophy of science’, (1977) The 
Monist 60/4 453 p460 
114 Kymlicka, ‘The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism’, p99 
115 Shachar, ‘Two Critiques of Multiculturalism’, p292 
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As with cultural defences, the less that is known about a minority culture, the more 
internal elites are able to manipulate the construction of the concretised version of 
culture. The shaping of the dialogue between the minority culture and the majority 
falls to those who divulge the cultural information. The more that is known about a 
minority culture, the less minority leaders can manipulate and shape the narrative to 
their own ends. 
Post-colonial theories or criticisms of multiculturalism often ask the question ‘who 
shapes the received account of culture?’. The answer is largely the ‘elite’ of the 
minority, which results in the perpetuation of existing power hierarchies. Shachar 
notes that ‘when the state must choose a particular authority within the 
accommodated group to which it will delegate authority, pre-existing religious or 
traditional leaders find themselves suddenly transformed into political figures within a 
definite institutional hierarchy.’116 These individuals are able to shape the narrative in 
such a way that ensures their position of dominance, often to the detriment of the 
more vulnerable members as discussed above.117 
 
If the deemed authority figures within the minority have been the ones to convey the 
account of their culture to the majority, then there is little or no representation of the 
views of marginalised groups within that minority.118 In general, this account is what 
was or has been conveyed to the majority by deemed authority figures within the 
minority cultures. This leaves the vulnerable members of the community with no 
influence, and a state that, by sanctioning the version of a culture that marginalises 
them, seems to support their marginalisation and subordination. 
 
In this way, the desire of the state to accommodate minority cultures can give those 
who shape the account of their culture an amount of power over the other members. 
The culture which is related, and which becomes the cultural narrative, tends to 
represent the culture in its incarnation at the time of arrival to the state, and as related 
by the people who hold power within that arrival incarnation. The people who relate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions, p84 
117 This can also be seen from the discussion of Hmong culture above, and the women who wish it to 
be more progressive.  
118 As articulated by Okin in Is Multiculturalism bad for women?, p12 
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the culture therefore have little or no interest in the development of it because their 
interests are best served by the maintenance of the minority culture as is. 
Whereas usually ‘cultural survival depends, in part, on a community’s ability to adapt 
to the needs and interests of all its members’, this ceases to be the case. 
Multiculturalism, with its tendency to perpetuate difference,119 creates a situation in 
which the narrative of a culture becomes static, and the hierarchies and prejudices 
become frozen in time. The minority elite have no need to listen to the qualms of 
marginalised members to ensure cultural survival, because their ‘version’ of culture 
has become the ‘official’ version that is accommodated by the state. Further, ‘If what 
justifies accommodation is the distinctiveness of the group, then the group has a 
strong interest in emphasising its social differences by holding back internal 
changes’.120 It is due to this phenomenon that the ‘exit rights’ strategies fail to work. 
A vulnerable member of a minority group has very limited power in shaping the 
cultural community, and this is further limited by the concretisation of that minority 
culture. Their voice is often marginalised. The ‘elite’ within the group have such 
power over the cultural narrative that it is highly unlikely the threat to leave will have 
any effect. Further, given that the power of the ‘elite’ (exacerbating the vulnerable 
individual’s lack of voice in their community) comes from the state’s policies of 
accommodation, there is no reason for an individual to suppose that the state, which 
implicitly sanctions their oppression, would provide a better alternative.  
 
From the distortion of the cultural narrative, created by those who hold power within 
the group, it is apparent that the problem is not just that multicultural policies 
currently seem to concretise versions of a culture. In addition to promoting the 
feelings of ‘otherness’ associated with minority cultures, multiculturalism allows the 
elite within the minority to seek to shape the narrative in this way.  
 
It must be noted that this manipulation does not always stem from an inherently 
negative desire to deprive vulnerable culture members of the liberation that they 
might otherwise be afforded by the state - although it can indeed have this aim and 
certainly this effect. In some circumstances the distortion of the official account of a 	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culture is designed to retain separateness for more innocent reasons. Consider the 
position of some initial waves of Islamic immigration to Europe.121 Apart from 
Islamic residents of France and the UK, who largely arrived due to colonial ties, 
‘most other Muslim workers on the continent for example, the Turks in Germany 
initially came not as migrants, but as a temporary labour force. They were looked at 
as staying in Europe only long enough to earn enough money to return to their 
countries of origin with the means to start a new existence there’. 122  
This meant that they were afforded protections, exemptions and extensions in a way 
that allowed them to separate themselves from the rest of the population in certain 
ways. Both the majority and minority cultures viewed the minority presence as 
transient, and therefore the minority felt it was important to preserve their way of life, 
to make it easier to return to their geographical homeland, and the majority did not 
feel that it was important to consider a long-term plan of assimilation or even 
integration.  
 
Whilst this approach may have been appropriate initially in certain circumstances, it 
no longer serves the interests of minority populations or of the wider society. The 
reality of the situation has changed, yet the approach has not. Even where the 
motivation was not to preserve the culture so that immigrants could re-integrate to 
their home country or community more easily, there has been a tendency towards the 
concretisation of culture.  It is often suggested that liberal multiculturalism has its 
roots in Herder’s conception of cultural difference. 123This may help to explain why it 
lends itself to the creation of a static conception of minority cultures. Herder was 
concerned with the authenticity of culture, and viewed each ‘culture’ as a self-
contained whole which would only be corrupted by the intrusion of ‘foreign’ 
influences: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 When discussing Muslim immigration to Europe it is important to remember that there are some 8 
million native European Muslims, largely in Turkey.  
122 Bassam Tibi, Muslim migrants in Europe: between Euro-Islam and Ghettoisation, in AlSayyad and 
Castells (eds) Muslim Europe of Euro-Islam: politics, culture, and citizenship in the age of 
globalization (Lexington Books, 2002) p36 
123 For an in-depth analysis of this conception, see Sonia Sikka, Herder on Humanity and Cultural 
Difference, (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
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‘In (Herder’s) view each culture is valuable and worth cherishing because it 
contributes a distinct tune to the universal symphony. This implies that if a 
cultural community wishes to enjoy others’ respect, it should fiercely strive to 
remain unique and guard against all external influences.’124 
  
 
Whilst Herder recognised the influence of history in shaping the cultural narrative or 
‘volk’, there was no perceived future trajectory for cultural development, as the 
contemporary manifestation of the culture was regarded as its purest form. In practice 
the conception of the minority culture has changed very little since the inception of 
normative multiculturalism, however the minority cultures themselves have changed 
considerably, and in some cases even created entirely new cultural identities.125 
Whilst the development of new cultural narratives can and should be seen as a 
positive consequence of multicultural societies, Herder would view such development 
as a corruption of the authenticity of culture. Once a culture has been corrupted in this 
way, it ceases to be worthy of respect. Therefore, in order to remain worthy of respect 
cultures must be preserved in their ‘authenticity’, essentially requiring their 
concretisation.  
 
 This impasse is reminiscent of Barry’s argument126 that liberal multiculturalism 
necessitates a choice between the perpetuation of difference and its erosion – with no 
possible middle ground. It could be suggested however, that a middle ground does in 
fact exist, but that its roots lie in an altogether different conception of 
multiculturalism.  It is on this possibility that the next section will focus.  
 
 
It has been surmised that there are two particular challenges or pitfalls facing the 
current body of ‘liberal’ multicultural thought. In the first instance, the preoccupation 
with being seen to value diverse cultures has led to a fear of being seen to interfere in 
the affairs of a minority community. It is this fear that has opened the way for 	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125 See the consideration of new identities (particularly Euro-Islam) in AlSayyad and Castells (eds) 
Muslim Europe or Euro Islam.  
126 Discussed at fn49 above 
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manipulation. The reluctance on the part of the state to enter into a discussion of the 
validity of a cultural claim means that there exists a ‘hands off’ approach, which fails 
to provide adequate protection for vulnerable members of cultural groups.  
Secondly and leading on from the first issue, there has been a move towards ‘respect’ 
for culture in a way which concretises and essentialises a specific version of a 
minority culture, emphasising and solidifying underlying differences and inequalities 
within and between minority and majority groups. By seeking to define the minority 
cultures that might need protection, the state stunts the natural development of these 
cultures, and thereby perpetuates the initial inequalities that multiculturalism purports 
to address. 
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B: CONSTRUCTING A NEW MULTICULTURALISM 
 
Jacob Levy’s ‘Multiculturalism of Fear’ 
 
 
Origins and Aims 
 
In an attempt to provide a solution to these problems, Jacob Levy developed ‘the 
multiculturalism of fear’, which he contrasts with the generally popular forms of 
liberal multiculturalism. Taking its name from Judith Shklar’s 1989 essay ‘The 
liberalism of fear’, Levy’s work aims to change the priorities which govern the 
accommodation of cultural minorities within a liberal state, with the prevention of 
cruelty and fear taking precedence over the promotion of ‘human rights’. Shklar 
argued that liberalism had ‘only one overriding aim: to secure the political conditions 
that are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom’.127 In order to achieve this, 
Shklar believes that there must be a clear distinction between the personal and the 
public – this distinction need not be in any particular place, but it must be present. 
Although liberalism may be linked more closely to certain other beliefs, it must be 
viewed as a standard in its own right. ‘Every adult should be able to make as many 
effective decisions without fear or favour about as many aspects of her or his life as is 
compatible with the like freedom of every other adult’. Shklar identifies the state as 
the entity, which, through use of its unique resources of ‘physical might and 
persuasion’, has the most crucial role to play, as it can be the greatest source of social 
oppression.  In the context of the ‘liberalism of fear’ therefore it is the state’s 
responsibility to guard against the inappropriate exercise of persuasion and to ensure 
the conditions in which each adult can have an equal choice set.  
Viewing ‘acute fear’ as the biggest threat to liberalism and therefore to personal 
freedom, Shklar argues for a political theory that addresses this threat without 
necessitating an absolute moral basis: 
‘The liberalism of fear in fact does not rest on a theory of moral pluralism. It 
does not, to be sure, offer a summum bonum toward which all political agents 	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should strive, but it certainly does begin with a summum malum, which all of 
us know and would avoid if only we could. That evil is cruelty and the fear it 
inspires, and the very fear of fear itself.’128 
 
Drawing from this exposition, Levy develops a ‘multiculturalism of fear’ as one that 
justifies legal concessions or proscriptions that aim to reduce and ultimately eliminate 
fear. Whilst Shklar’s ‘liberalism of fear’ placed emphasis on the power of the state or 
government to inspire fear, or to abuse their ‘physical might and persuasion’, the 
multiculturalism of fear rests also on the fear that might be inspired within minority 
groups themselves.   
 
In doing so, Levy aims to avoid the difficulties of defining or essentialising a specific 
culture as ‘the multiculturalism of fear counsels against spending our time trying to 
define what it is in cultures that we respect or recognise. The political actors being 
asked to judge, respect and recognize belong to cultures of their own, and may be all 
too ready to take advantage of the paradox of standards in order to reject the cultures 
of others’.129 The structural problems which liberal multiculturalism faces due to the 
difficulty of reconciling the primacy of individual liberal rights with a focus on a 
wider group or cultural community are largely avoided by placing the elimination of 
fear at the fore. Rather than focusing on the primacy of a ‘right to culture’ Levy 
concentrates on the eradication of fear, followed by the elimination of cruelty and 
humiliation, and only then by liberal rights. This allows the focus to be on the 
consequences of a practice, rather than its intrinsic ‘cultural value’. 
 
Levy argues for respect of both the fluidity and durability of cultural membership and 
ethnic identities. ‘Levy’s model of multiculturalism seeks to steer a course between 
those theories that condemn cultural identification and long for all minorities to 
become good Millian liberals and those that condemn liberalism for failing to be 
sufficiently hospitable to diversity.’130 The importance of culture to the individual 
should not be underestimated – it is instrumental in the construction of the self, and 	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shapes the way that the individual interacts with the rest of society. At the same time, 
there should be recognition of the fact that cultural identities are fluid: both in terms 
of an individual’s personal relationship with that identity, and in terms of the 
evolution of the culture itself. Cultures are in a constant state of development.  
In spite of this fluidity, the durability of culture is just as important. Through all 
processes of cultural change and development, the culture remains ‘intact’ as a whole 
construct. The essential elements may evolve and be adapted over time, but the 
culture itself endures. Because of this durability, it is, Levy argues, a mistake to 
attempt to drastically change or disregard a cultural practice all at once. To do so only 
creates tension between the state and that community, and is likely to lead to 
‘proscribed’ cultural practices being continued in secret.131 The suggestion that 
culture can be defined or changed at will is, according to Levy, the worst kind of 
supremacy that a state can practice.  
  
Rather than attempting to concretise and preserve identities, or to eradicate them and 
assimilate minority populations, Levy suggests that these communities should be left 
to develop naturally, with intervention only where practices fail to meet the minimum 
standard of prevention of fear and humiliation.  
 
The aim of this version of multiculturalism, in contrast to liberal multiculturalism, is 
not necessarily to preserve cultural difference. Nor is the goal to remove or disregard 
that difference. Rather, Levy’s multiculturalism aims to ensure that diverse cultures 
are able to coexist with minimal prejudice and for their members to have equal 
footing within society - whether culture is preserved or not is entirely dependent on its 
compatibility with the standard of the prevention of fear, rather than any inherent 
value derived from simply being ‘cultural’. Once ‘fear’ has been eliminated, there is a 
genuine possibility for universal mutual tolerance,132 effectively creating a level 
playing field for members of all cultural communities: 133 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 This will be discussed in more detail below.  
132 The difficulty of universal mutual respect will be discussed below.  
133 Difficulty naturally arises in the definition of the applicable standard of fear – this will be addressed 
below. 
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‘Whether or not minority cultures ought to be helped in sustaining themselves, 
whether assimilation or diversity is desirable, whether and how to forge 
common identities – the multiculturalism of fear insists that these are 
secondary questions. Neither identities nor groups are the centres of 
attention… The treatment that persons are given because of their group 
membership, or that they are accorded when they try to belong to their groups, 
takes priority.’134 
 
The creation of cruelty in multi-ethnic societies 
 
Levy identifies four ‘dangers’, points vulnerable to the creation of cruelty and 
conflict, which commonly arise within multi-ethnic societies: forced incorporation 
and secession; forced exclusion; internal cruelty; and the lack of adequate frameworks 
for intercultural interaction.135These dangers are neither exhaustive nor mutually 
exclusive, and the relationship between any minority and the state ‘may include 
elements of each’.136  
 
Forced incorporation and secession, from Levy’s point of view, is generally related to 
processes of what he terms ‘nationalising states’.137 In this way it is concerned 
particularly with the treatment and definition of national minorities within a state. He 
considers the debate between John Stuart Mill and Lord Acton, over whether 
nationalism can support liberty: Mill argued that ‘a pluralistic state would lack fellow-
feeling and political sympathy among its people’ whereas Acton supported the idea of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear, p39 
135 The danger of internal cruelty is perhaps the most relevant to the current project and will be 
considered separately. 
136 Articulating a complete theory of multiculturalism, Levy begins by examining large-scale conflicts.   
137 The concept of a nationalising state, as coined by Rogers Brubaker in ‘Nationalism Reframed’ 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996) is one which is closely related to the idea of a ‘nation-building 
state’, that seeks to create a homogenous national identity, often at the expense of minority 
communities or nations. The use of the term ‘nationalising’ as opposed to ‘nation-building’ is in part 
intended to acknowledge that such states often damage or destroy other ‘nations’ in their bid for 
homogeneity. Examples of nationalising states would include Spain during the Franco regime which 
prohibited the use of minority languages such as Catalan, as well as suppressing regional practices in 
order to foster a unitary national identity.    
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plural loyalties as a way of ensuring scepticism of the state. Whilst Levy is 
sympathetic to both opinions, and concedes that they each seem to be right 
sometimes, he suggests that the evaluation of a particular manifestation of nationalism 
should begin with a presumption against its desirability, but that this presumption 
must be refutable: 
 
‘Liberalism is properly sceptical of any demand to put loyalty to a group 
ahead of particular persons or universal moral duties. But when faced with a 
choice between loyalty to a state and loyalty to a nation, it is a mistake for 
liberalism to mechanically prefer ostensibly patriotic loyalty to the state. Both 
can be dangerous, and which poses the greater danger is an empirical 
question.’138 
 
Levy therefore (in the context of nationalising states and the incorporation of national 
minorities) favours a negative presumption against the desirability of the absorption 
of a minority, but is adamant that this presumption should be refutable. In this way 
there is greater protection of the minority, as the presumption is in favour of the 
vulnerable group. The refutability of this presumption ensures that there is not undue 
prejudice against the nationalising group.139  
 
The danger posed by forced exclusion of a disfavoured minority is considered to be 
slightly different. Levy considers a wide range of policies and behaviours to constitute 
forced exclusion, from on-going stigmatisation to ethnic cleansing and even genocide. 
‘If we fear violence and cruelty then we must greatly fear expulsions and the creation 
of refugees. The stateless are outside anyone’s official protection and are almost 
necessarily subject to rule by simple force.’140 
 
Where the excluded minority remains within the boundaries of a state, there is a risk 
of both state and private violence against them, and the line between the two can be 
blurred – with inaction by the state being seen as tacit approval for private actions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear, p44 
139 This discussion is perhaps not immediately relevant to the present argument; however it provides a 
useful starting point for the possible application of a negative presumption on a smaller scale.  
140 Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear, p45 
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Forced inclusion (incorporation) and exclusion can overlap, Levy suggests, in cases 
such as that of the Roma. Where Roma populations have been ‘resettled’ and 
therefore included by a state they have often been treated as outcasts and second-class 
citizens (excluded) by their new neighbours and local authorities.  
 
The two final ‘dangers’ arising in a multi-ethnic society are more nuanced and 
relevant to the present discussion. The lack of adequate frameworks for intercultural 
interaction refers to the difficulties of creating and promoting understanding and 
cross-cultural dialogue between groups (minority or majority). ‘If forced 
incorporation is the failure to adequately recognise the degree of separateness of two 
communities, the lack of a framework is insufficient recognition of the fact of 
togetherness.’141 There needs to be a wider, overarching framework within which 
cultural loyalties and narratives are played out, one which takes into account that 
there can be no inherently superior group: 
‘Because our claims and our demands and our beliefs about what is right 
collide with one another, no one group’s demands or identity or beliefs about 
justice can, by themselves, provide sufficient reasons for decisions of law and 
public policy in favour of the group.’142 
 
There need to be impersonal institutions and a framework that transcends cultural 
membership. This belief echoes the liberal preoccupation with the importance of not 
making value judgements about other cultures; however its focus is on the 
impersonality of standards rather than valuing and maintaining cultural difference:  
 ‘…conventions regarding intercultural exchanges and transactions cannot 
simply codify the traditional internal morality of one group or the other; and they 
cannot simply pretend that such exchanges will not exist. Interactions will take place, 
as will changes in cultural identity and migrations across communal lines.’143 
 
Levy argues that intercultural mixing and development is inevitable within a multi-
ethnic society. The existence of an intercultural framework is designed to mitigate any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Ibid p48 
142 Ibid, p49 
143 Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear, p50 (emphasis added) 
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danger or tension between communities that might arise as the result of such mixing. 
Whereas a direct negotiation between cultural communities might result in a formal 
agreement of separateness - stemming from the desire (often predominantly of group 
leaders) to retain the perceived purity of their culture – given the inevitability of 
mixing between cultures, whether benign or aggressive, an impersonal framework is 
necessary to protect those who cross the divide.144 There is a risk that the ‘impersonal’ 
framework imagined by Levy is not a realistic prospect, however this will be 
discussed below.  
 
Internal cruelty and the Multiculturalism of Fear 
 
The final danger, and the one to which Levy devotes most thought, is that of internal 
cruelty: of the treatment of vulnerable individuals and groups within minority 
communities. Cultural communities have the potential to promote, endorse or practise 
coercive or cruel behaviours, and this should be protected against. This is one way in 
which Levy believes his multiculturalism, based on the avoidance of fear and cruelty, 
is superior to traditional liberal multiculturalism: 
‘Traditional cultural norms are coercively enforced, or the norms themselves 
sanction coercion or violence. If multiculturalism is properly grounded in the 
avoidance of these evils rather than in any distinctive moral status of cultural 
groups, then there isn’t any particular moral difficulty (whatever practical 
difficulties there may be) in restraining such practices.’145 
 
There is a fine line to be drawn between cultural practices that are cruel, and ones that 
are simply alien to another culture, in other words ‘it’s worth pausing to discuss the 
difference between preventing internal cruelty and simply remaking internal cultural 
practices that we don’t like.’146 Where liberal multiculturalism might simply avoid 
this distinction by taking the hands-off approach discussed above, Levy proffers a 
solution (albeit an incomplete one) in the form of a doctrine of consent.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Levy combines this point with a discussion of the danger of statelessness – see The Multiculturalism 
of Fear, p51 
145 Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear, p51 
146 Ibid p52 
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Marriage and the doctrine of consent 
 
The difference between a forced marriage and an arranged marriage provides an 
illustration of the importance of the standard of consent. The practice of parents or 
other individuals arranging a marriage for their child (assuming for the moment 
minimum age requirements are met) is common in some cultures. It is not a familiar 
practice in many Western cultures, and it may be one which some find hard to 
understand, but that in itself does not make arranged marriage inherently ‘bad’. When 
the parties consent to the arrangement and to the marriage, there can be no objection, 
however when the parties do not consent, the marriage becomes a forced marriage; a 
practice that cannot be justified under the multiculturalism of fear.  
 
A more delicate argument is presented relation to polygyny. Whereas there is some 
discussion over whether polygyny is necessarily oppressive towards women, it 
certainly commonly has been. The question then arises of how to deal with polygyny, 
legally speaking. Levy suggests that the natural response would often be to 
criminalise polygyny, or to refuse to recognise subsequent plural marriages. ‘But the 
appropriateness of that kind of response depends on the relationship between law and 
social practice. If polygyny is a continuing realist, if it continues to exist on the 
ground, then non-recognition or criminalisation may harm the women they are 
designed to protect.’147 Levy further argues that the law has more leverage to promote 
reform if the state recognises polygamous marriages. This recognition can be 
conditional, and therefore allows the state a measure of control over the practice. If 
the state imposes (as in South Africa) a requirement that all existing spouses consent 
before an additional wife can be taken, then polygyny cannot be used as a threat 
within a marriage, and wives will still gain legal rights that they would not have had 
were the practice not recognised.  
 
Although the standard of consent does have potential to be a useful tool in the 
avoidance of internal cruelty, it has not perhaps been completely thought through. 
Levy suggests that a requirement of consent protects those who might otherwise be 
vulnerable; however this assumes that the vulnerable individuals are in a position to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Ibid, p57 
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give this consent freely. Much as with the exit rights thesis, care should be taken to 
ensure that withholding consent is a practicable option, otherwise there is no 
protection gained from requiring it. It might be argued however, that this difficulty 
could be overcome with a proper framework for consent, and whilst Levy does not 
develop the practicality of his suggestion, it should not be disregarded for this lack of 
development. 148 
 
Setting aside the concerns relating to the authenticity of a declaration of consent, 
Levy points out that the real power of a criteria of consent is that it allows the state to 
unambiguously take the side of the vulnerable party. This gives (particularly) women 
in conservative cultural communities more rights and greater power than they would 
otherwise have had, were (for example) their marriage not recognised. In so far as a 
practice is not inherently cruel, Levy believes that recognition is a far better option 
than proscription, and that through recognition gradual change might be achieved.  
In the context of practices that are clearly contrary to standards of prevention of fear 
and humiliation (as opposed to those which might be justified or consented to) Levy 
finds himself mainly in agreement with the feminist critiques of multiculturalism, as 
far as the existence of danger is concerned. He does, however, offer a slightly 
different solution to those suggested by Okin and others above: 
 
‘A multiculturalism justified in terms of preventing violence and cruelty offers 
no cultural shield to protect violent and cruel internal practices. 
Accommodating the law to multicultural social realities in some way, 
however, is often in the interests of women in the minority culture. This means 
that a legal system which refuses to acknowledge cultural difference will not 
effectively protect the interests of women in minority cultures. Sometimes this 
accommodation of law to multicultural realities will be directed at change of 
minority cultural practices, but when it is, proscription of those practices 
should be used only in fairly extreme cases – cases of real cruelty – and often 
partial or constrained recognition of cultural practices will be more conducive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 It might also be suggested that the obvious practical difficulties in recognising polygyny would 
outstrip the benefits.  
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to cultural reform and the protection of women’s rights than will proscription 
or non-recognition.’149 
 
Whereas several have argued that the best way to help vulnerable individuals within 
minority groups is to refuse to recognise the authority of the group, to legislate against 
discriminatory practices, or even to attempt to eradicate the culture all together, Levy 
offers a more tempered approach. Levy attributes this methodology to Montesquieu’s 
view that ‘laws are a bad method of changing manners and customs; it is by rewards 
and example that we ought to endeavour to bring that about. It is however true at the 
same time, that the laws of a people when they do not grossly and directly affect to 
shock its manners must insensibly have an influence upon them, either to confirm or 
change them.’ 150 
 
Whilst culture cannot be used as a shield against interference or a justification for 
treatment against the accepted standards of fear, violence or humiliation, it is 
recognised that proscription is rarely the answer. It might be suggested that the 
current approaches seem to leave two options - either to wholly accept a minority 
culture and its practices in some official, concretised form, or to explicitly refuse to 
recognise that minority culture or practice, thereby removing all possibility of control 
or reform. Levy’s approach provides a far more realistic method of dealing with 
minority practices which are detrimental to vulnerable individuals or which fall foul 
of the standard of prevention of fear.  
Where laws are unrealistic, idealistic or aggressive in their treatment of a minority 
issue or practice, individuals will be less likely to abide by them, continuing the 
practice behind closed doors. Ultimately an approach to difference that is based on 
proscription of illiberal actions will lead to higher levels of self-segregation and 
cultural differentiation, as well as the perpetuation of inequality. On the other hand, if 
those who make the laws acknowledge both the durability and fluidity of culture, it 
becomes easier to guide change in a more organic way. Whilst this may not have the 
immediate consequences desired, it does allow for progressive change, of a kind that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear, p52 150	  Ibid.	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is more likely to ‘stick’ and to be accepted by all members of the wider state 
community.  
 
Evaluating the ‘Multiculturalism of Fear’ 
 
Levy and the ‘key flaws’ of liberal multiculturalism 
 
Levy’s multiculturalism of fear is framed as an alternative to the contemporary 
popular forms of liberal multiculturalism. Levy claims to recognise the difficulties 
facing liberal multiculturalism, and offers a theory in which the priority is on the 
elimination of fear, rather than the primacy of individual rights. 
His exposition is, however, not immune to criticism, and there are several ways in 
which it can be and has been attacked. By examining these shortcomings, it is 
possible to arrive at an idea of how one might move beyond such limitations and 
establish a complete idea for a multicultural future. Given the extensive discussion 
above of the flaws of liberal multiculturalism, and the identification of two key 
failings, (of the hands-off approach failing to protect internal minorities, and of the 
concretisation of culture) it is necessary to consider how Levy’s theory might provide 
an answer to these particular problems.  
 
With regards to the first flaw - that of the hands-off approach - Levy’s work certainly 
fares better than that of other liberal multiculturalists. The extensive discussion of the 
risk of internal cruelty in a multi-ethnic society suggests that Levy is keenly aware of 
the importance of ensuring that cultural practices do not have a negative impact on 
members of that group.  
 
By re-prioritising, and ensuring that the emphasis is on the elimination of fear, rather 
than on the individual’s right, there is less of an emphasis on allowing cultures to 
remain independent. Whereas liberal multicultural models may have difficulty in 
dealing with cultural practices, due to the belief that cultures cannot be fully 
understood by those external to them, Levy relies on the existence of a ‘summum 
malum’ to legitimise interference.  
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Placing the prevention of fear and humiliation above the preservation of the ‘right to 
culture’ means that Levy is able to circumvent the preoccupation with being seen to 
interfere with cultural practices. Further, this approach largely eliminates the tension 
between the rights of the group and the rights of the individual, allowing the state to 
avoid accusations of supremacy. Where the liberal multicultural models have 
followed a hands-off approach which in certain (albeit extreme) circumstances has 
allowed individuals to literally get away with murder; the definition of a summum 
malum, the avoidance of which takes priority, allows the state to define boundaries 
more clearly, and directly oppose cultural practices which fall foul of this standard. 
Levy believes that ‘there’s certainly no legitimate cultural defence for murder’. The 
suggested doctrine of consent is a means of placing cultural discussions in the public 
domain. As discussed above, the requirement of consent would allow the state to 
unequivocally take the side of the vulnerable party, without opening itself to 
accusations of imperialism where the cultural practice is one alien to the majority 
culture.  
 
Whilst there are several positive differences between Levy’s work and that of many 
liberal multiculturalists, ‘The Multiculturalism of Fear’ sometimes fails to follow 
through on its own ideas. Levy’s vision of setting aside the primacy of a ‘right to 
culture’ is tempered slightly by his warning against hypocrisy and judging the culture 
of others:  
 
‘Cultural difference should not prevent a state from both criticizing and taking 
action against violence and cruelty against women. It should, however, remind 
members of a majority culture to look inward as well as outward for abuses. 
It’s easier to notice someone else’s patriarchal or illiberal actions than it is to 
notice our own; and that ease makes hypocrisy too tempting. Moreover, we 
should be wary of criticizing cultural norms, values, and traditions as quickly 
as we do acts of violence and abuse. We are, all of us, born into cultures and 
socialized into norms. Living in a cultural community – as with belonging to a 
family, holding a job, joining a voluntary association, or participating (in) any 
of the other intermediate groupings in which we lead our lives – means, in 
part, living under rules which would be violations of liberty if imposed as laws 
by the state. That fact in itself is not a restriction of our freedom or rights; but 
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it is easy and tempting to see the norms and socializations of other cultures as 
such restrictions. Again, that tempting hypocrisy should be resisted. ‘151 
 
Whereas the primacy of the prevention of fear should allow the state to interfere 
where there is legitimate suspicion that a cultural practice has a negative effect, Levy 
appears to back track and echo some of the reluctance of liberal multiculturalism. 
The above quote demonstrates three important truths: firstly that the state and legal 
system are not free from culture, secondly that all cultural practices should be 
questioned, minority or majority, and thirdly that the existence of a ‘right’ does not 
require an individual to activate it. These observations however, appear to lead Levy 
towards a more tempered approach than might initially have been the case, and the 
result is reminiscent of the liberal multicultural models: reluctance to interfere. Levy 
(rightly) cautions against interfering in cultural practices simply because they differ 
from our own, but his caution must be interpreted carefully so as to avoid the risk of 
legitimising and providing an excuse for behaviour which might cause fear. In a 
system where the primary standard is the prevention of fear, there should be no 
sensitivity towards ‘interfering’ with a practice – there can be no intrinsic merit 
derived from the fact that a practice is ‘cultural’. Where there is hesitation to enquire 
into a practice, there is a risk of legitimising a practice that may induce fear. Non-
interference can suggest tacit approval.152 
 
No state or legal system can be free from culture, however it does not follow that the 
state/law is unfit to have anything to do with culture:  
‘The neutrality of the law with regard to ethical differentiations within a given 
society is necessary if only for the following reasons: in complex societies the 
totality of the citizens can no longer be bound together by a substantive value 
consensus, but only by a consensus on what the procedure for the legitimate 
legislation and execution of power is.’153 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear, p62 
152 It is of course important that a cultural practice be considered objectively, but over-emphasis of 
cultural merit can obscure the consequences of the practice that is in question. A potential method for 
dealing with this difficulty will be discussed below.  
153 J Habermas, ‘Struggles for recognition in the democratic constitutional state’ (1993) European 
Journal of Philosophy 1.2 128, p144. This call for procedural integrity will be discussed further below.  
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Levy’s proposal has the potential to build towards an impartial framework that could 
safeguard vulnerable members of cultural groups. Given that he recognises the 
importance of creating frameworks for intercultural interactions, and that he 
acknowledges the dangers that vulnerable members of cultural communities can face, 
his reluctance to develop his proposal is frustrating.  
Whilst it is wrong to require all individuals to choose to activate every right that they 
have – being free to bind themselves to the social and cultural norms of their choosing 
– it would be equally wrong to assume that all individuals who do not ‘activate’ their 
freedoms, or who submit to behaviour which might be thought to inspire fear or 
humiliation, do so willingly. Such an assumption creates exactly the same difficulties 
as those found in liberal multicultural models, as it removes any legitimate basis that 
the state might have to interfere in cultural practices.  
 
With regards to the second ‘key fault’ of liberal multiculturalism, Levy’s 
Multiculturalism of Fear is largely successful in avoiding the concretisation of 
cultures. As discussed above, the multiculturalism of fear rests on the recognition of 
both the fluidity and durability of culture. Following Montesquieu’s ideas on the 
limited ability of law to change behaviour, Levy makes the case for gradual, 
progressive change where there are cultural sensitivities in place. Whereas the danger 
with liberal multicultural models is that they rely too much on the preservation of a 
‘genuine’ culture, Levy recognises that cultures are in a constant state of 
development, and that they should not be seen as concrete and unchanging.  
 
The Multiculturalism of Fear seeks to take a ‘long line’ view of cultural development 
and social cohesion. Immediate benefit may not be as apparent, however change must 
be in a positive direction, in a manner which is realistic, and which does not offend 
the durability of culture. 
 
 An example of this is found in Levy’s discussion of female circumcision in the 
United States. The analysis offered centres around the proposals made by the 
Harborview Medical Centre in Seattle154, which suggested, in light of the high 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 For the full discussion see Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear, pp53-57 
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numbers of requests from Somali and other African immigrants from countries where 
female genital cutting is common, that they provide an operation termed ‘sunna 
circumcision’, which might fulfil the symbolic function of female genital cutting, 
without risking complications during childbirth or sexual intercourse, or impairing 
sexual pleasure. The hospital and many members of the community viewed this as a 
positive suggestion, given that it would most likely lead to a reduction of the number 
of illegal operations, and in the number of young girls who were sent to their parents’ 
country of origin to have the more drastic versions of the operation performed there. 
On the other hand there was an outcry from other members of the community, who 
viewed this as legitimising a practice that represented a ‘particularly brutal kind of 
repression’. In the event the proposals were abandoned following the passage of a 
federal statute criminalising female genital mutilation.155 
 
Levy argues that the proposal would in fact have been an appropriate step, and that 
the federal ban may in fact have been counter-productive: 
‘…we do not make the world de novo, and passing a law does not simply 
remake the world according to the law’s intent. If their families carried out 
their original intentions, if they brought their daughters back to east Africa and 
had them mutilated, then the girls clearly were not made better off by the ban. 
This is true even if we suppose that a federal ban means that the practices of 
female genital mutilation will die out in America in another generation or two; 
we are still sacrificing the well-being of some real, living girls.’156 
 
This example provides an interesting insight into Levy’s convictions. Under the 
Multiculturalism of Fear, there is not the same ‘choice’ created between perpetuating 
and eradicating difference. There is simply an encouragement of gradual progression 
away from the summum malum.  
In the context of liberal multiculturalism there is a danger of concretisation arising 
from the fact that the received account of a culture is often delivered by those who 
have an interest in preserving the status quo. The primacy of the ‘right to culture’ 	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creates a special status for the received account of culture, and that account becomes 
the official version, which is then protected and preserved by the state and legal 
system. Due to the perceived importance of cultural sensitivity, as well as the 
tendency towards a ‘hands-off’ as discussed above, there is no room left for the 
development of or progression of the culture. In contrast, the primacy of the 
elimination of fear and humiliation opens the way for multiple dialogues, and an 
organic process of development. This process itself, however, is not above the risk of 
manipulation. 
 
The dangers of negative consequentialism and moral blackmail 
 
The multiculturalism of fear is not free from dangers itself, and Levy identifies one in 
particular which arises due to the use of negative morality. Whilst in theory a focus on 
the avoidance of fear is an appropriate way to deal with cultural difference, he 
suggests that there is a danger that, in the application, the use of a negative standard 
will create a ‘perverse incentive’ for individuals or groups to manipulate this to their 
own ends. Where the Multiculturalism of Fear dictates that the best course of action is 
that which creates least ‘fear’, there is the potential for moral blackmail - a threat to 
create fear if demands are not met: 
‘The rule of preventing an evil creates an incentive to threaten or create that 
evil to gain an advantage. The best-known example of this kind of problem is 
hostage taking and terrorism. If a government puts saving the lives of its 
citizens first, then those who are willing to take hostages or threaten acts of 
terrorism can extort any concessions they want from that government.’157 
 
Levy identifies two types of incentive – one to threaten violence or injustice now or in 
the future (moral blackmail) and the other to overstate wrongs from the past 
(exaggerated victimhood). Neither of these threats can be allowed to have power 
within the Multiculturalism of Fear, and it is in this context that the ‘long-line’ view 
of culture becomes important. Following a principle of non-negotiation, Levy argues 
that the long-term consequences must take priority over the accommodation of 
demands for temporary relief or benefit. As with policies of not negotiating with 	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hostage-takers/ kidnappers/ terrorists, there is a long-term benefit to resisting moral 
blackmail, whatever the short-term consequences. Further, Levy argues that claims of 
injustice should be evaluated to determine where the fault lies, and that there should 
be no reluctance to do this. Whilst liberal multicultural models tend to avoid the 
evaluation of cultural practices and of claims of injustice, preferring to take them at 
face value, the Multiculturalism of Fear would aim to engage with these claims. Levy 
acknowledges that this engagement would be difficult, and require particular effort, 
but that critically evaluating claims rather than simply caving in to threats would be 
beneficial in the long term.  
 
The applicable definition of fear 
   
Levy’s work has been criticised for seeming to rely on and apply only to extreme 
examples of cultural conflict. The lack of examination of more nuanced examples 
could be attributed to Levy’s reliance on Shklar’s Liberalism of Fear.  Shklar’s work 
deals with fear on a larger scale, generally emanating from the actions of the state 
itself, rather than from smaller cultural groupings. Shklar believed that one of the 
roles of the liberalism of fear was to address issues on a wider scale and to move 
‘away from the more exhilarating but less urgent forms of liberal thought.’158 In other 
words other lines of liberal thought were too preoccupied by the minutia to address 
the real issues. Whilst she accepted that the ‘less urgent’ forms of liberal thought 
might be more interesting, she believed that the larger picture should be addressed 
first. In the transposition towards multicultural theory, Levy retains much of the frame 
of reference used by Shklar, rather than scaling down to more subtle issues.  
This provides a difficulty, because the Multiculturalism of Fear is supposedly framed 
as an alternative to the more common forms of liberal multiculturalism, which tend to 
deal with (for better or worse) specific case studies of cultural difference.159 It is at 
times hard to compare the two theories when they operate on different scales.  
Further, it is suggested that Levy has constrained himself to more extreme examples 
due to the difficulty in defining the concepts of fear and humiliation. Kukathas 
identifies this as a key weakness in Levy’s work, stating that ‘the crucial problem is 	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what to do (or think) when the dispute is about what is and is not humiliating, or what 
constitutes cruelty, or what is the nature of evil.’160  
Within the context of the liberalism of fear, Shklar attempts to address this: 
 
‘Of fear it can be said without qualification that it is universal as it is 
physiological. It is a mental as well as a physical reaction, and it is common to 
animals as well as to human beings. To be alive is to be afraid, and much to 
our advantage in many cases, since alarm often preserves us from danger. The 
fear we fear is of pain inflicted by others to kill and maim us, not the natural 
and healthy fear that merely warns us of unavoidable pain. And, when we 
think politically, we are afraid not only for ourselves but for our fellow 
citizens as well. We fear a society of fearful people.  
Systematic fear is the condition that makes freedom impossible and it is 
aroused by the expectation of institutionalized cruelty as by nothing else.’161  
 
This fear of systematic or institutionalised cruelty is believed by Shklar to be 
universal, and therefore the prohibition of cruelty represents the expression of a moral 
standard that cannot be argued against. Whilst this might hold some water in terms of 
the examples suggested by Levy, it ceases to be sufficient when considering more 
sensitive cultural claims. What is considered to be cruel, and what therefore can be 
said to be ‘systematic cruelty’ naturally varies from culture to culture, and even 
person to person. Whereas certain acts of violence might be supposed to be 
considered ‘cruel’ by most standards, it would be impossible to state that they were 
universally thought to be so. The less ‘extreme’ the act of cruelty that inspires fear or 
humiliation, the harder it is to even suggest that most people must find it to be cruel.  
Once again there is a difficulty in defining the real standards on which the theory can 
operate, and it is this difficulty that poses the greatest challenge to Levy’s 
‘Multiculturalism of Fear’.  
 
By subscribing to the same fear of being seen to make judgements about other 
cultures (as discussed above) Levy confines his argument to the more extreme 	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examples – however, if it were to be accepted that fear and humiliation are subjective 
standards, the definition of which is key to a successful multicultural theory, it is 
suggested that the modified ‘Multiculturalism of fear’ could provide a viable solution 
to the current challenges facing multicultural thought.  
 
In Levy’s case, the avoidance of any clear statement of what might constitute cruelty 
on a more subtle level is frustrating. Whilst the theory focuses on ‘fear’, rather than 
any ‘right to culture’, in the examples given by Levy he seems loath to commit to this 
view. In spite of this reluctance, it is apparent that Levy does indeed accept the 
subjectivity of belief and of values: 
 
‘Not all religions make exclusionary claims to the truth, though many do; but 
no religion can be completely accepting of other faiths and retain any 
content…The same impossibility is evident for culture. Non-cruelty, non-
humiliation, and genuine tolerance are possible if not always easy. Public 
affirmation of respect and recognition, though, cannot be available to all 
cultures simultaneously. Ethno cultural groups develop in contrast to others; 
all too often a particular trait is valued precisely because it makes members 
seem better than some neighbouring group. To recognise what a group values 
in its own culture is to accept a standard by which some other groups fail to be 
worthy of respect. To give recognition and respect based on standards external 
to the culture similarly sets up a measure by which some will fail, and 
moreover includes the (hardly respectful) assumption that one’s pre-existing 
culture includes the resources for judging all others in the world.’162 
 
The unfortunate impossibility of universal respect of and between cultures provides a 
difficulty for multicultural theories. It is clear that Levy would be uncomfortable with 
the establishment of a (necessarily not universal) standard of ‘fear’, as it would seem 
to contradict the liberal roots of his theory, specifically by removing some people’s 
choice to pursue elements of their own culture. This reluctance leads him to limit his 
focus, and therefore opens the theory to criticism. If it is impossible for there to be 
universal mutual respect between cultures, then, rather than claiming to strive towards 	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this impossibility and opening the way for manipulation and perpetual inequality, it 
might be preferable to accept the inherent subjectivity of values, and to proceed on 
that basis. Currently, on the surface it seems that there is an aversion towards ‘cultural 
relativism’, but that any move in the other direction, towards the creation of a set of 
universally applicable standards and values, is seen as a sign of Western Imperialism. 
It is suggested that in reality, even though theorists carefully avoid any explicit 
statement of support for value judgements, the theories themselves rely on them.  
 
Falling at the same hurdle as liberal theories of multiculturalism, Levy is limited by 
the reluctance to make any specific statements about what might be considered to 
inspire fear. Where the examples of cultural conflict are discussed at an internal state 
level, they are examples of forced marriage, polygamy and female genital mutilation. 
These are all practices that clearly fall foul of the aim of the prevention of and 
eradication of fear. Whilst the way in which Levy approaches these practices is novel 
and promising, this does not follow through into the more ‘everyday’ practices which 
might constitute fear or oppression.   
 
Disparity between theory and application 
 
A further difficulty that Kukathas points out in Levy’s theory is the disparity between 
the aims of the Multiculturalism of Fear and its application. For Kukathas, this 
disparity is most apparent in the discussion of female genital cutting. Whilst Levy’s 
conclusion is well reasoned, his support for the alternative procedure rather than 
complete proscription might seem at odds with the principles of his theory as 
previously set out. It is clear that by many standards of fear and cruelty even a mild 
form of genital cutting would be considered intolerable. As such, it would naturally 
follow that this would not be allowed under the multiculturalism of fear, and yet Levy 
argues in favour of it. Whilst Kukathas finds this position to be inconsistent, it might 
be suggested that this has more to do with the difference between the aim and the 
process by which that aim is achieved.  
 
The aim of the law would have been to move towards ending the practice entirely, by 
providing a halfway point, where a (comparatively, although not completely) 
harmless procedure could be offered, in a safe environment. This is consistent with 
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Montesquieu’s view on the realistic approach to law making; however it is perhaps 
inconsistent with other elements of Levy’s argument. Specifically this application of 
the Multiculturalism of Fear raises questions about the avoidance of moral blackmail, 
as discussed above. If the ‘mild’ procedure is favoured because otherwise some girls 
will be taken out of the country to have the ‘full’ procedure performed, or it will be 
done as a ‘backstreet’ operation, thereby placing lives in danger, then this surely 
comes under the heading of ‘moral blackmail’. The multiculturalism of fear counsels 
against reacting to this kind of manipulation, yet Levy seems to favour a position that 
takes into account this danger. To raise this as a criticism is not particularly helpful 
however, because it points to a difficulty in application of the values of the 
Multiculturalism of Fear. The gradual change of cultural norms that has to take place 
per Montesquieu will always come into conflict with the possibility of moral 
blackmail. It is simply the case that decisions will have to be made in each specific 
situation. Moral blackmail aside, there is a general discrepancy between the 
elimination of fear, cruelty and humiliation, and the long-line view of gradual change. 
If the elimination of fear is the primary aim and focus of the Multiculturalism of Fear, 
then taking a long-term view rather than favouring immediate change proves difficult. 
Ultimately however, this is not necessarily detrimental to Levy’s theory, because the 
compromise between the immediacy and the efficacy of a measure that is designed to 
eliminate cruelty allows room for reflection and to adapt the process for each specific 
norm that is called into question. This flexibility, which is not justifiable under the 
rubric of ‘rights’, is a benefit that allows organic and realistic change to take place.  
 
For Kukathas this disparity between theory and practice is a direct consequence of the 
reluctance to adequately define what might constitute the standards of prevention fear 
and cruelty to be upheld. In the context of FGM, Levy suggests that ‘the interests of 
women and girls may be better served by drawing a distinction between what is cruel 
and intolerable and that which is wrong but tolerable.’163 This is not a particularly 
easy distinction to make, however, because of the likely discrepancy between the 
opinions of the cultural group and the state: 
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‘This distinction is crucial for the multiculturalism of fear. Yet, in the 
Harborview case, a very clear argument can be made that even the mild 
genital cutting proposed falls on the “cruel and intolerable” side of the 
distinction. The general public and federal legislators clearly took this view. 
Equally, the immigrant parents, if they were among those who hoped the 
practice would eventually be eradicated, would surely argue that mild cutting 
fell on the “wrong but tolerable” side of the distinction. (And this is not to 
mention those parents who insist that full cutting is essential to maintain girls’ 
dignity and marriageability and who would consequently deny that even 
infibulation is “cruel and intolerable.”) In these circumstances, such 
distinctions themselves cannot do the work demanded of them.’164 
 
It therefore appears, that even in the apparently extreme case of female genital 
cutting, there is a difficulty in agreeing whether it is immediately contrary to the 
summum malum that the Multiculturalism of Fear seeks to avoid. It is apparent that 
there needs to be a clearer definition of cruelty, or a suitably impartial mechanism for 
deciding whether a practice constitutes cruelty or humiliation: 
 
‘Levy’s recommendation seems to be that the state should “decline the 
culturally relativist path” (p. 57) and assume that there is a difference between 
right and wrong. It should criticize and take “action against violence and 
cruelty” (p. 62). Yet the crucial element in this recommendation remains 
undefended: that when there is disagreement about what constitutes cruelty; 
the state’s view should prevail and be enforced. Perhaps it should. But if so, it 
cannot be on the basis of the principles of the multiculturalism of fear. After 
all, from the viewpoint of those whose cruel and intolerable practices are 
suppressed, it is the behaviour of the authorities that is in fact cruel and 
intolerable. What reply is to be made in response to this challenge? One must 
surely be found.’165 
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This discrepancy between the reluctance to approach the evaluation of cultural 
practices from the view point of the state, and yet at the same time refuse to establish 
a viable alternative, is possibly the key difficulty in Levy’s work. An alternative 
approach must be found, one that fulfils the criteria of being both complete enough to 
protect vulnerable parties, and flexible enough to allow intercultural dialogue and 
development of all cultures. It is argued however that Levy’s difficulty in establishing 
an alternative approach is largely due to a lack of development, rather than any 
fundamental flaw.  
 
Were the multiculturalism of fear to be used as a starting point for a new approach to 
cultural diversity and multi-ethnic states, it would have the potential to provide a 
viable solution that has so far eluded common forms of liberal multiculturalism. The 
difficulties in establishing an adequate definition of fear, cruelty and humiliation, can 
be overcome and a possible approach to this will be discussed below.  
 
Beyond Levy: the potential expansion of the Multiculturalism of Fear 
 
 
The basic premise of Levy’s work (the primacy of fear as opposed to individual 
rights) marks a strong shift in multicultural thought, and one which has the potential 
to be developed as an effective and realistic answer to the difficulties of more popular 
liberal multiculturalism, however the delivery and application of this premise are 
lacking slightly, both in substance and conviction.  
 
 
 
Redefining cultural standards 
 
The difficulty in adopting an approach based on the Multiculturalism of Fear lies in 
the appropriate definition of fear and cruelty that is to be accepted. Kukathas’s 
assertion that there is a discrepancy between the values of the multiculturalism of fear 
and the seemingly inevitable prevalence of the majority definition of fear and cruelty 
is correct. In arguing for gradual change in the direction of the norms of the majority 
culture (particularly in the context his discussion of FGM), Levy seems to suggest 
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that the majority culture’s definition of cruelty or fear should be the relevant marker. 
Whilst he is advocating change in a gradual and ‘culturally sensitive’ way, it might be 
suggested that this has more to do with the belief in Montesquieu’s argument that 
gradual change is a more effective way of changing behaviour in the long term, than it 
has to do with a deep respect for the cultural practice.  
 
Whatever Levy’s personal convictions, following the negative construct of the 
Multiculturalism of Fear in the way it is presented leads to a different conclusion. 
Whilst a society strives towards universal tolerance for diverse cultures (accepting the 
impossibility of universal respect), it cannot do so on the basis of supposed ‘majority’ 
values. To refuse to engage in discussion and compromise between cultural groups 
undermines the principle of tolerance, and – for the Multiculturalism of Fear – creates 
a type of oppression antithetical to the theory itself. Where the cultural practices of 
‘minority’ groups are suppressed because they are contrary to the values of the 
majority, their cultural beliefs are being disregarded and devalued, therefore creating 
oppression and humiliation. This must be avoided if the Multiculturalism of Fear is to 
be followed correctly. 166 
 
It follows that there must be another standard by which to evaluate cultural practices, 
and that this standard must represent as impartial a summum malum as can be found. 
This statement of the summum malum would need to be both detailed enough to 
provide a legitimate basis on which the state could act against a practice which was 
suspected of inspiring fear, even on an apparently minimal basis, and flexible enough 
that it would be open to intercultural dialogues, discussion and development.  
 
To begin to approach this standard, it is necessary to consider the common division of 
cultures into ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ – specifically ‘minorities’ and ‘the majority’. 
As discussed above, Levy cautions against the supremacist attitude that can lead to a 
lack of introspection on the part of the majority culture. Where cultures are 
categorised as either being the ‘majority’ or something ‘other’, then there is a 
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temptation to judge all ‘other’ cultures by the values of the majority.167 In order to 
move away from this tendency, the relevant comparator needs to change.  
 
Parekh believes that the overemphasis of the minority ‘racialises’ multiculturalism 
and ‘becomes a site for thinly veiled racist sentiments. This is most 
unfortunate…multiculturalism is not about minorities; for that implies that the 
majority culture is uncritically accepted and used to judge the claims and define the 
right of minorities. Multiculturalism is about the proper terms of relationship between 
different cultural communities. The norms governing their respective claims, 
including the principles of justice, cannot be derived from one culture alone but 
through an open and equal dialogue between them.’ 
 
The division between minorities and (the) majority is problematic for a number of 
reasons. The differentiation creates an inevitable ‘us’ and ‘them’ approach to cultural 
difference, and when so divided there is a democratically defensible view that the 
majority should prevail over the minority. This view creates hostility between cultural 
groups: 
 
‘The affective and moral meaning of ‘us’ – what might be called ‘we-ness’- is 
a fundamentally structuring force. The other side of ‘we-ness’, equally potent, 
is difference: who are they and why are they here?’168 
 
The division of people into minority and majority runs the risk of effectively creating 
two classes of citizen: those whose cultural practices are subject to scrutiny, and those 
whose practices are above scrutiny. If multiculturalism is approached from the 
perspective of the majority, then it is difficult to arrive at a place of social cohesion.   
 
Parekh is entirely right that multiculturalism should not be defined on these terms. 
Were it not for the existence of minorities, both cultural minorities and internal 
minorities within cultural groups (including the majority culture), there would be no 	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need for multiculturalism, but that does not lead to the conclusion that it should 
inevitably be defined in those terms. The over-emphasis of the minority (as being 
other than the majority) both places the majority on a pedestal and undermines the 
value of a ‘minority’ culture. The ‘majority’ is erroneously seen as a single, 
homogenous group and the unique nature of each ‘minority’ culture is devalued by 
being grouped together with all others which happen not to be that of the majority. 
The dynamic between ‘us’ and ‘them’ defines ‘us’ as one and ‘them’ as many, whose 
individual importance is side-lined by their collective label of ‘minority’.  
 
The emphasis on multiculturalism being purely about minorities, as opposed to the 
whole society, has led to the unattractive choice that Barry identified: between the 
progressive erosion of minority culture towards the culture of the majority, and 
concretising such cultures, forever preserving them as something ‘other’ than the 
norm. This emphasis, as Parekh points out, seems to contain the assumption that the 
‘majority’ is above judgement, and that it represents the best possible form of culture. 
This echoes the common liberal fallacy, derived from, amongst others, the work of 
Herder, which suggests that culture is the product of continuous development up to 
this moment, but that in this moment it exists in a permanent and perfect state.169 
There is a middle ground to be found however and ‘we ought to recognise that 
cultures are permanently changing and developing and that there is no reason to 
‘freeze’ a culture in order to preserve it’.170 The majority culture, just as much as any 
minority culture, is a fluid structure, and it needs to evolve in order to retain any 
meaning. Even if it is recognised that culture is fluid, the emphasis on the ‘protection’ 
of the minority culture creates tension: 
 
‘A great deal of paternalism in embedded in the assumption that while ‘we’ 
can survive change and innovation and endure the tensions created by 
modernity, ‘they’ cannot; that ‘we’ can repeatedly reinvent ourselves, our 
culture, our traditions, while ‘they’ must adhere to known cultural patterns.’171  	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It is likely that minority cultures, particularly immigrant cultures, will come to 
resemble majority cultures more closely over time, however change will occur in both 
directions, and the majority culture is as likely to absorb some of the values and 
attributes of minority cultures. This flexibility makes it difficult to justify basing an 
assessment of a minority practice on the values of the majority, as they are likely 
equally difficult to define, and transient themselves.  
 
Even accepting that the ‘majority’ will develop just as much as the minorities, where 
minorities increase in number due to immigration or any other factor, there is 
increasingly less of a ‘majority’ to be identified. In the context of a dwindling 
majority, a society that bases the legitimacy of all cultural practices on their 
compatibility with majority norms faces a difficulty. These norms become less 
relevant to the actual society, and increasingly do not represent the norms of the 
population. Where the legal norms are so removed from those of the actual 
population, both their effectiveness and legitimacy are called into question. 
 
It is undeniable that the legal system and institutions of the State are products of the 
historical culture of the state, and that this will usually be the majority culture.172 
However, when the cultures present in a state are increasingly diverse the impartiality 
of these institutions is key. As the breadth of cultural influences expands, it is 
impossible even to identify a homogenous majority. The majority culture is not free 
from the constant conflict and development that marks the fluidity of cultural 
dialogue. Where a society is committed to multiculturalism and the support and equal 
value of diverse beliefs and cultures it is difficult to approach the creation of laws and 
of norms solely from the perspective of the majority culture. This is even truer of a 
society based on the Multiculturalism of Fear, as pointed out by Kukathas above. 
Oppression is inextricably linked to fear and humiliation, and therefore oppression by 
the state of a minority culture is contrary to the aims of the Multiculturalism of Fear. 
The prevention of fear, cruelty and humiliation applies equally to that created within 
and between cultural groups and to that created by the state and its treatment of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Former colonies provide the most common exception to this 
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groups and individuals. Preventing a minority cultural practice purely because it is 
contrary to the norms of the majority is not justifiable under the Multiculturalism of 
Fear; therefore the basis on which the legitimacy of a practice is assessed must be 
something other than the norms of the ‘majority culture’. Rather than continuing to 
consider multiculturalism and values in the context of majorities and minorities, it 
may be beneficial to search for an alternative standard – a ‘reasonable man’ test for 
cultural practices. This would not work in the context of a positive theory for a 
multicultural society, because that would involve the establishment of a positive 
concept of the good life, which might be held by a ‘reasonable man’. Given the 
subjectivity, and particularly the cultural subjectivity of any concept of the good life, 
the establishment of such a marker would inevitably betray the cultural persuasions of 
those creating it. Within the context of the negative theory of the Multiculturalism of 
Fear however, it is entirely possible to create a ‘reasonable’ standard of prevention of 
fear and humiliation.  
 
The emphasis on the avoidance of a summum malum, which might reasonably be 
supposed to be universal, gives the state the ability to accommodate different 
conceptions of the good life, rather than inevitably steering towards that of the 
‘majority’.  
 
Habermas observed that ‘the neutrality of the law vis-a-vis internal ethical 
differentiations stems from the fact that in complex societies the citizenry as a whole 
can no longer be held together by a substantive consensus on values but only by a 
consensus on the procedures for the legitimate enactment of laws and the legitimate 
exercise of power.’173 Where there is no discernable agreement on values, there can 
only be agreement on the way in which to determine the right course of action. This 
creates a demand for the construction of impartial frameworks for intercultural 
interaction, where members of all cultures are able to be heard and to justify their 
practices. The nature of these frameworks and institutions and their remit needs to be 
established with great care. The importance of the existence of appropriate 
frameworks for intercultural interaction is acknowledged by Levy, yet he does not 
elaborate particularly on what these might be or how they would work in practice.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  173	  Habermas, Struggles for Recognition, p135	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The Multiculturalism of Fear has an advantage over more common multicultural 
theories in that it is constructed as a theory of negative morality. The best course of 
action is that which creates the least harm, specifically the least fear or humiliation 
(moral blackmail notwithstanding). This places it in a unique position regarding the 
move away from a language of minority and majority cultures. The Multiculturalism 
of Fear does not require a conception of the good life, it merely requires an idea of the 
‘bad life’; the summum malum which should be avoided. Something might reasonably 
be thought to be part of a summum malum without itself being a statement of the good 
life. Such a theory is better able to come to a neutral statement of values, and to 
evaluate all cultures from the same perspective. There is no claim of the universality 
of values, just the idea that there are certain things that should be universally avoided 
– the creation of fear, humiliation and oppression.  
 
Assessing cultural practices 
 
Levy goes some way towards suggesting how a practice might be evaluated, through 
his doctrine of consent; however in general there is a lack of development in this area. 
In terms of the doctrine of consent, it is indeed important, and placing emphasis on 
the fact that there is no requirement to ‘activate’ all liberal rights allows for a 
flexibility within cultural practices, and for the individual to pursue those that they 
desire.  
 
Where there is an adequately defined summum malum there will be certain cultural 
practices which are clearly contrary to this – genocide, ethnic cleansing, honour 
killings and so on. There are other practices, however, which fall closer to the line of 
acceptability. Whilst they may be clearly intolerable from the point of view of one 
culture, they are equally clearly tolerable from another, and it is these practices for 
which the establishment of adequate frameworks for intercultural interaction is 
essential. Even practices such as female genital cutting are defensible from certain 
cultural perspectives – the legal treatment of these practices requires great care.  
 
Before there can be an assessment of the compatibility of a cultural practice with the 
avoidance of the summum malum these cultural practices which may be contrary to 
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the prevention of fear and humiliation have to be identified. Levy does not raise any 
suggestions as to how that might be approached; however there are certain aspects of 
his work which may be helpful. In the context of nationalising states, Levy advocated 
a (refutable) negative presumption, that the actions of the nationalising state would 
create fear and humiliation. By ensuring that the presumption was that the practice of 
nationalising was harmful, the practice becomes a legitimate subject of discussion. 
The refutable nature of the presumption allows for flexibility, and the consideration of 
incidences on a case-by-case basis.  
This use of a refutable negative presumption could be extended to apply to all cultural 
practices that are close to the ‘line’ of the prevention of fear and humiliation. Where a 
‘reasonable man’ might suspect that a practice inspires fear or humiliation, there 
could be a presumption that it does. This presumption would then place the practice 
within the ambit of the state, and the impartial mechanisms established. As with the 
negative presumption against nationalising states it would be important to emphasise 
that the negative presumption is entirely refutable, as it may be that a greater 
understanding of the practice is required in order to alter the ‘reasonable’ view of it. 
The multiculturalism of fear itself is a negative construct – one that rests on the 
elimination of fear rather than the promotion of the ‘good life’. As such, in order to be 
effective, it has to look for instances of fear and of humiliation, manipulation or 
coercion, and either rectify them, or satisfy itself of its own misinterpretation. Whilst 
it may seem counterintuitive to be deliberately suspicious of cultural practices, it is in 
fact beneficial to all members of the community. If the suspicions are correct, then 
fear and humiliation are able to be eliminated in that context. If the suspicions are 
refuted, then this is because there is greater knowledge about a cultural practice, 
which otherwise would continue to be mistrusted. 
 
 
The creation of an impartial framework for the discussion of cultural practices which 
are presumed to fall foul of the requisite standard of fear would inevitably involve a 
great deal of care, and the format of such a framework will not be discussed in the 
present project, however there are a number of ways in which such a framework could 
represent a positive (negative) step towards social cohesion, intercultural and 
intracultural understanding.  
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Whereas currently there is a tendency to pursue a hands-off approach to cultural 
difference, even where there is extreme mistrust of a practice, the negative 
presumption would enable discussion and dialogue. The hands-off approach, 
stemming from the idea that individuals out with a culture are not well-suited to 
evaluating practices within it, does not protect vulnerable individuals from harm 
which may occur within their own cultural group. In contrast, a negative presumption 
necessitates dialogue and explanation, allowing practices to be scrutinised both by 
those outwith and within the group that they originate in. Not only does this provide a 
safeguard for vulnerable individuals within groups, who would have a platform on 
which to express their opinions, it also promotes social cohesion by fostering a greater 
understanding between cultural communities. 
 
Creating a forum in which cultural practices can be examined and discussed on a 
case-by-case basis174 allows members of cultural communities to have a voice in the 
determination of the legitimacy of that practice. Where, under a hands-off approach, 
vulnerable members or internal minorities might be side-lined, and the direction 
decided by those with authority in the group, an open discussion could allow these 
members to have a meaningful input into the evolution of their culture. As discussed 
above, Okin is of the opinion that no received information about a culture can be 
considered accurate unless it comes from a representative sample of the group, 
including those who are oppressed within it. The hands-off approach, working on 
received information from cultural leaders fails this test; however a framework 
operating on a negative presumption would be able to seek the input of these 
members.  
 
Once a practice is deemed to be within the state’s/ framework’s legitimate area of 
inquiry, there are certain factors which might be taken into account. The doctrine of 
consent would play a role, as individuals subject to the practice in question are often 
those best placed to assess whether there is a risk of fear and/or humiliation. Whilst 
the hands-off approach uses this fact to justify non-interference on the basis of the 
subjectivity of culture, the suggested framework would consider this as a factor in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Case by case here denoting each different practice, not each individual case of the manifestation of 
that practice.  
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impartial assessment of the practice. Equally, because there can be no requirement for 
individuals to actively pursue their rights (in other words individuals are free to bind 
themselves to whatever norms they desire), where a practice is deemed acceptable by 
those who are affected by it, there might be a higher threshold of fear to be met in 
order to interfere with that practice.  
It is noted that consent cannot be the determining factor in all circumstances. In many 
cases, such as those involving a high degree of suspicion of coercion or a vulnerable 
party such as a child, consent would have little importance. The doctrine of consent is 
entirely fallible, and as such it is perhaps unwise to use it as an entire justification for 
any one practice, rather as a contributing factor in a wider decision making process.175 
There cannot be consent to a practice that is clearly contrary to the universal summum 
malum, only to those that are closer to the line between acceptable and unacceptable 
practices, and where the parties in question have the capacity to consent.  A child’s 
consent to female genital cutting, for example, could hardly be considered an 
acceptable waiver of their rights. Vulnerable members of cultural communities, and of 
society in general, require additional protections, and as such the doctrine of consent 
would not always be a sufficient safeguard. Rather there would need to be a thorough 
consideration of the merits of each practice, from the perspective of those within and 
out with the cultural community in question.  
 
Whilst more common forms of multicultural theory rest on a liberal idea of a ‘right to 
culture’, the multiculturalism of fear as proposed would require a cross-cultural 
discussion of each practice. Whereas liberal multicultural models rely on the idea that 
those within a culture are best suited to evaluate it, Levy correctly points out that it is 
far harder to see flaws in our own culture than it is in someone else’s. Where there is a 
suspicion of incompatibility with the avoidance of the summum malum both those 
within and out with the culture in question have a right to be involved in the 
discussion. Those out with the culture are able to provide an alternative perspective, 
allowing engagement with the cultural practice, and those within the culture are able 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 It may be that a practice is deemed acceptable only when the individuals in question explicitly 
consent, however the assessment of the legitimacy or permissibility of the practice in general would be 
more wide-ranging.  
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to provide their justifications, helping to shine light on the practice for those who may 
have misunderstood it.  
 
 
At first glance, a system that endorsed all suspicions against cultural practices would 
seem overzealous; however it is argued that this would not be the case. By creating 
the real possibility that cultural practices will be examined on the basis of the 
avoidance of fear and humiliation, the state can ensure that it is in the interests of 
cultural communities themselves to internally assess practices. Communities seek 
freedom to exercise their norms, and in doing so will take increased care to avoid the 
summum malum. In the context of a positive theory that advocates a conception of the 
good life, there is the risk of reactive culturalism, where those who feel that their 
culture is being devalued, disregarded or marginalised become more extreme and 
entrenched in their views.176 On the contrary, a negative presumption gives greater 
freedom, and fosters positive change. ‘Everything is allowed, unless it falls foul of 
this standard’, rather than ‘nothing is allowed, unless it meets this standard’.  
 
The existence of such a framework would have benefits reaching much further than 
simply those stemming from its decisions. Cultural groups would be more inclined to 
listen to each other and to the views of all members within their own group, knowing 
that they would have weight within the assessment of a cultural practice. 
Although the exit rights thesis aims to give voice to otherwise marginalised group 
members it falls on the difficulty of ensuring that exit from the cultural group is a 
realistic possibility. The threat of an impartial assessment of a cultural practice lends 
an official weight to the opinions of these members.  As opposed to the hands-off 
approaches, which leave power within the hands of a small number of figures within a 
cultural group, the negative presumption would give power to those otherwise 
oppressed in their own groups. This has additional benefits, which cannot be matched 
by the exit rights thesis alone. Whilst the exit rights thesis requires the victim of any 
negative impact of a cultural practice to leave their community – a great personal 
sacrifice - the negative presumption allows them to have power within their 
community, without having to threaten to abandon their life there. As with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 See Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions, pp35-37 
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doctrine of consent, there is a requirement to value the opinions of all members of a 
cultural group, and the state is therefore able to unequivocally support the 
marginalised members. Given that the presumption is towards negativity and the 
avoidance of fear and humiliation is the primary concern of the state, those claiming 
that the practice is harmful have an amplified voice. This creates a situation where 
those in power have to compromise to find an acceptable medium, or risk the entire 
practice being assessed and found to be incompatible with the state’s aim to avoid the 
summum malum. 
 
The multiculturalism of fear and non-domination 
 
The proposed structure of a modified multiculturalism of fear has much in common 
with the neo-republican idea of freedom as non-domination, however the two 
positions differ crucially. Both stem from negative conceptions of liberty,177 
supporting the idea that the individual is free in so much as they are free from 
interference, however, the multiculturalism of fear being derived from the liberal 
tradition, the two theories diverge on the measurement of this interference. Pettit 
distinguishes these views: 
 
‘One would say that the important thing is not to suffer interference, whatever 
the basis on which you escape it, in the actual world; the other would say that 
the important thing is to enjoy such protection that you are not particularly 
susceptible to interference in the actual world or in any of those counterfactual 
worlds where others conceive hostile intentions: you are as secure against 
interference as you can be made, consistently at least with others enjoying the 
same security.’178 
 
The liberal school of thought is broadly aligned with the first view, and the republican 
with the second.179 The concept of freedom as non-domination as set out by Philip 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 See ‘Pettit, Philip. "Liberalism and republicanism." Politics 28.4 (1993): 162-189, p165; also Isaiah 
Berlin on positive and negative liberty; ‘Four Essays on Liberty’, London, OUP, 1969.  
178 Pettit, Liberalism and Republicanism, p165 
179 ibid p166 
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Pettit in Republicanism180 (and in A Theory of Freedom181) suggests that freedom 
from interference is not sufficient in itself to constitute freedom, and that there must 
also be freedom from domination – that is, no potential for interference. The 
commonly used example is one of slavery – a slave whose master does not choose to 
exercise power over them still has the capacity to do so, therefore whilst free from 
interference, the slave is not free from domination. Whilst another has the capacity to 
interfere arbitrarily – even though they choose not to – there is no freedom.  
 
The idea of ‘arbitrary’ interference is crucial to Pettit’s concept. In this context there 
are two dimensions or definitions of ‘arbitrary interference’ in play; firstly the 
common definition that an act is arbitrary when it is chosen or not chosen on the 
whim of the actor, and secondly  ‘chosen or rejected without reference to the interests, 
or the opinions, of those effected. The choice is not forced to track what the interests 
of those others require according to their own judgements’.182183 
 
The ability to ‘interfere’ on what Pettit would call an arbitrary basis is in fact crucial 
to the multiculturalism of fear. Although the negative construction of the 
multiculturalism of fear means that the state will refrain from interfering where 
possible, and that groups are therefore ‘free’ to follow their cultural practices, the 
remaining potential to interfere is equally important as a safeguard. The modified 
multiculturalism of fear has two important advantages derived from the ability to 
interfere  – firstly it allows vulnerable members of cultural groups a voice, and 
secondly it facilitates discussion and intercultural dialogue.  
Were the multiculturalism of fear to be designed along the lines of a neo-republican 
concept of non-domination, there would be far less protection available for vulnerable 
group members. Where there is no power to interfere on an arbitrary basis (taking the 
second definition of ‘arbitrary’ used by Pettit) vulnerable group members are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government: A Theory of Freedom and 
Government. Oxford University Press, 1997.;  
181 Pettit, Philip. A theory of freedom: from the psychology to the politics of agency. John Wiley & 
Sons, 2013. 
182 Pettit, Republicanism, p55 
183 See Markell, Patchen. "The insufficiency of non-domination." Political theory 36.1 (2008): 9-36.for 
a critical analysis of Pettit’s definition.  
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essentially left to fend for themselves, perhaps relying on the ‘exit rights’ theory 
discussed above.184 
The act of interference in this context must be considered to be the calling in to 
question of, and the imposition of a negative presumption against, a specific cultural 
practice. Following this ‘interference’ it has been suggested that all concerned parties 
would be given a voice, and indeed the guarantee of that voice, within the impartial 
framework mentioned above.  At that point the definition of arbitrary as offered by 
Pettit would cease to apply, as the interests and opinions of all those affected become 
crucial to the evaluation of a cultural practice. That this would take place within a 
recognised impartial framework in fact gives further weight to the voice of those 
concerned, in addition to facilitating intercultural dialogue. The initial interference, 
however, would indeed be deemed arbitrary by the standards established by Pettit, 
and thus not consistent with the ideal of non-domination.  
This difference between the multiculturalism of fear and the idea of non-domination 
is one of the greatest strengths of the modified multiculturalism of fear. The ability of 
the state to interfere and call into question a cultural practice  - on the basis of a 
‘reasonable’ suggestion that it may induce fear - allows both for the more effective 
protection of internal minorities and for the promotion of intercultural understanding. 
 
 
Although it is difficult to arrive at a statement of how a theory based on the 
Multiculturalism of Fear would work in practice, it is clear that it has the potential to 
constitute an effective system for the handling of cultural difference. Based on a 
negative construct, it is able to create a remit that allows questioning and discussion 
of cultural practices in a way that systems based on the primacy of rights, and 
particularly the concept of a ‘right to culture’, cannot. Vulnerable members within 
cultural groups are better protected by a system that guarantees them a voice, and is 
dedicated to the avoidance of fear, humiliation and oppression, rather than to the 
‘preservation’ of culture. Cultures too are better ‘protected’ by the Multiculturalism of 
Fear, as it recognises the futility both of attempting to freeze or to re-make a culture. 
The emphasis on the fluidity of culture (of all cultures, not simply minority cultures), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Were this ‘arbitrary interference’ not possible under the modified multiculturalism of fear the theory 
would face the same problems created by the ‘hands-off approach’ fostered by an over-emphasis of a 
right to culture.  
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and the potential for discussion and intercultural interaction, allow for a move towards 
greater social cohesion and continued natural development of cultures.  
 
 
 
 
  
	   90	  
Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has aimed to explore the present state of and difficulties facing traditional 
forms of liberal multiculturalism as well as present the foundations for a possible 
alternative approach.  
The development of the contemporary notion of multiculturalism stemmed from a 
number of factors, including the development of international human rights standards 
and increases in immigration. Liberal multiculturalism itself came to be as an answer 
to the dilemma of how to ensure that all individuals were able to exercise their liberal 
rights, including the freedom to belief and their way of life. Unfortunately, stemming 
as it does from the belief in the primacy of the individual, this form of 
multiculturalism has faced certain hurdles.  
 
The criticism of liberal multiculturalism has been damning, and from some accounts it 
would seem that there was no hope at all for multiculturalism. It has been suggested 
however that these accounts are somewhat exaggerated, and that liberal 
multiculturalism has had some success, predominantly in areas concerning indigenous 
and national minorities. It is not possible to dismiss the criticisms entirely, and it 
should not be attempted, because they stem from legitimate statements of the 
consequences of pursuing a liberal multiculturalist agenda. Both the internal and 
external critiques raise valid and important points about the failings of liberal 
multicultural models, and these cannot be ignored. Two key flaws of the liberal 
arguments were identified, flaws that were shared between both the internal and 
external critiques, suggesting that they are in fact fundamental difficulties which 
might not be able to be remedied by liberal means.  
 
The difficulty in constructing a theory of multiculturalism which places importance 
on the individual’s right to their own cultures is that it reduces the ability of the state 
to interfere with the life of a community where a practice might be considered 
‘cultural’. If there is a right to culture then there cannot simultaneously be a right to 
interfere in a culture, therefore practices are largely left alone. A further consequence 
is that individuals are able to manipulate the state by claiming cultural justification for 
their actions. Given that no-one out with the culture in question is thought to have a 
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deep enough understanding of that culture to make a statement about the validity of 
this claim, the state is left to rely on the received account of a culture. This account is 
most usually received from those with a position of authority within the group, and 
whose interests largely lie with preserving the status quo and reducing external 
interference with the culture.  
 
Additionally there is a tendency for groups to self-segregate when they are 
encouraged to pursue a concretised version of culture. Whilst early liberal thinkers 
recognised that culture was the product of centuries of progress and evolution, they 
tended to assume that its present incarnation must be the ultimate and best version, 
and should be preserved in its authenticity. Liberal multiculturalism therefore stems to 
some extent from a belief that culture is only corrupted by outside influences.  
 
 
By avoiding a statement of the good life, but retaining a statement of the summum 
malum, Levy’s theory of multiculturalism is able to legitimately enquire into cultural 
practices which might reasonably be suspected of falling foul of this standard, and in 
doing so opens up the barriers to inter and cross cultural communication. Whereas the 
hands-off approach of liberal multiculturalism - stemming from both a misguided 
respect for the ‘right to culture’ and the awareness that cultures are inherently 
subjective – fails to protect vulnerable parties within cultural groups, as it effectively 
cedes responsibility for them to those already in charge; Levy’s theory allows the 
vulnerable members to have a voice, and in fact tends towards the presumption that 
they do not wish these practices to continue.  
 
An approach that resists the temptation to concretise cultural practices or to ‘freeze’ 
them in order to protect their integrity will also have more success at promoting social 
cohesion and cross-cultural understanding. The liberal approach has left the door open 
for caricatures of cultural stereotypes, and the apparent ‘3 S’ model of 
multiculturalism. If the concern is moved away from preserving specific cultural 
attributes, and towards the promotion of the prevention of fear and humiliation, then 
these attributes and related practices will be free to develop and change naturally.  
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The criticism of multiculturalism, particularly liberal multiculturalism as it relates to 
immigrant populations, has been damning. Although it is important to explore these 
criticisms in depth, it is undeniable that in some contexts at least, multiculturalism has 
not been very successful. There is still ingrained racism, mistrust of cultural 
communities, a tendency towards self-segregation and a lack of knowledge about 
other cultures. Although the vocabulary may have changed, and ‘integration’ might 
not be a word currently in favour in multiculturalist circles, Roy Jenkins’ 1966 
statement remains true: 
 
'Integration is perhaps a rather loose word. I do not regard it as meaning the 
loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture.  I do not 
think we need in this country a 'melting pot', which will turn everyone out in a 
common mound, as one of a series of carbon bodies of someone's misplaced 
vision of the stereotyped Englishman… I define integration, therefore, not as a 
flattening process of uniformity, but cultural diversity, coupled with equality 
of opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance… If we are to maintain 
any sort of world reputation for civilised living and social cohesion, we must 
get far nearer to its achievement than is the case today.'185 
 
Following the trail of liberal multiculturalism has worked only for some groups, and 
even then not completely. The diverse cultural groups within states require as much 
support as ever, and it is perhaps time to reconsider the approach. The evident 
structural difficulties with liberal multiculturalism are possibly too fundamental to be 
remedied, and an alternative needs to be tried. Levy’s Multiculturalism of Fear, 
although somewhat embryonic in his own exposition, has the potential to meet this 
demand, and to rebalance the approach to cultural diversity within societies. A 
plethora of cultural identities in almost every state means that there is little agreement 
on what might constitute the ‘good life’ however the negative morality proposed by 
Levy draws upon arguably universal (and largely instinctual) values: the avoidance of 
fear, cruelty and humiliation. In many countries there is not really a discernable 
‘majority’ culture – just as Jenkins warned against turning everyone into the 
‘stereotyped Englishman’, it is important to ensure that the historical culture of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 c Rattansi, Multiculturalism, p9 
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state is not assumed to be superior to that of other groups. Although Levy’s theory 
itself needs work, it has the potential to provide a solution to the difficulties facing 
liberal multiculturalism. There needs to be less of an emphasis on the ‘majority’ and 
‘minority’, rather an acknowledgement that each individual in a liberal society has as 
much of a role to play in the development of culture as the next. Where it might be 
counterintuitive to seek a person’s views on the practices of another culture, if there is 
to be a socially cohesive society then this type of dialogue and discussion need to take 
place. A cultural practice is not solely the concern of those who practice it, but also of 
anyone in the same society. With greater understanding between cultures, there will 
be increased tolerance (and in some cases respect) for the practices and beliefs of 
others.  
 
It remains to be seen what the best way in which to implement a multicultural theory 
based on negative morality might be, but certainly it has the potential to provide an 
answer to the difficulties facing more common lines of thought. Vulnerable internal 
minorities, the victims of Shachar’s ‘paradox of multicultural vulnerability’, are better 
protected in a context where the state has a legitimate remit to enquire into cultural 
practices and to require their voices to be heard. These individuals no longer need to 
rely on the ‘exit option’ to make their point audible, and are able to find a balance 
between their culture and their own wishes. There is a long way to go before any 
theory based on the Multiculturalism of Fear could provide a definitive answer to the 
problem of multiethnic and multicultural societies, but it is suggested that it is an 
excellent place to start.  
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